Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 2070
Опубликовано на портале: 22-05-2007
Ariel Pakes, Richard E. Ericson
Review of Economic Studies.
1995.
Vol. 62.
No. 1.
P. 53-82.
This paper provides a model of firm and industry dynamics that allows for entry,
exit, and firm-specific uncertainty generating variability in the fortunes of firms.
It focuses on the impact of uncertainty arising from investment in research and exploration.
It analyzes the behavior of individual firms in an evolving market place and derives
optimal policies, including exit. Then it adds an entry process and aggregates the
optimal behavior of all firms, including potential entrants, into a rational expectations
Markov-perfect industry equilibrium and proves ergodicity of the equilibrium process.
Numerical examples illustrate the detailed characteristics of the stochastic process
generating industry structures.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-05-2007
Luis M B Cabral, Ali Hortaçsu
NBER Working Paper.
2007.
No. 10363.
We propose a basic theoretical model of eBay's reputation mechanism, derive a series
of implications and empirically test their validity. Our theoretical model features
both adverse selection and moral hazard. We show that when a seller receives a negative
rating for the first time his reputation decreases and so does his effort level.
This implies a decline in sales and price; and an increase in the rate of arrival
of subsequent negative feedback. Our model also suggests that sellers with worse
records are more likely to exit (and possibly re-enter under a new identity), whereas
better sellers have more to gain from buying a reputation' by building up a record
of favorable feedback through purchases rather than sales. Our empirical evidence,
based on a panel data set of seller feedback histories and cross-sectional data on
transaction prices collected from eBay is broadly consistent with all of these predictions.
An important conclusion of our results is that eBay's reputation system gives way
to strategic responses from both buyers and sellers.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-05-2007
Доклад подготовлен Викторией Голиковой, Ксенией Гончар, Борисом Кузнецовым и Андреем
Яковлевым. Научный руководитель проекта Евгений Ясин.
В докладе также использовались результаты исследований Владимира Гимпельсона, Леонида
Григорьева, Ростислава Капе люшникова, Анны Косыгиной, Валерия Миронова и Ксении
Юдае вой. Статистическое приложение подготовлено Ольгой Уваровой.
Полезные замечания и комментарии были получены от Андрея Белоусова, Владимира Дребенцова, Ирины Денисовой, Веры Елисеевой, Натальи Ивановой, Андрея Клепача, Евгения Кузнецова и Виктора Полтеровича. Авторы также благодарны Кристалине Георгиевой, Итцхаку Голдбергу, Александре Гросс, Раджу Десаи, Джону Литваку, Евгении Савченко, Хонг Тану, Алану Уоткинсу и Марку Шафферу за полезные уроки сотрудничества при реализации настоящего проекта.
Полезные замечания и комментарии были получены от Андрея Белоусова, Владимира Дребенцова, Ирины Денисовой, Веры Елисеевой, Натальи Ивановой, Андрея Клепача, Евгения Кузнецова и Виктора Полтеровича. Авторы также благодарны Кристалине Георгиевой, Итцхаку Голдбергу, Александре Гросс, Раджу Десаи, Джону Литваку, Евгении Савченко, Хонг Тану, Алану Уоткинсу и Марку Шафферу за полезные уроки сотрудничества при реализации настоящего проекта.
Опубликовано на портале: 03-05-2007
Надежда Михайловна Розанова
TERRA ECONOMICUS.
2005.
Т. 3.
№ 1.
С. 43-61.
В статье представлен краткий обзор этапов современной экономической политики России
и анализ нормативных документов и проектов программ развития в области экономической
политики. Автор задаётся вопросом, способствует или препятствует экономическая политика
России реализации конкурентных начал в экономике. Задача экономической политики на
современном этапе развития рыночных отношений видится автору в нейтрализации неравных
условий конкуренции, доставшихся российской экономике от административного прошлого
либо созданных стратегическими усилиями фирм на основе прошлого неравного наследства.
Вместе с тем, отмечается необходимость принятия нехарактерных для других стран с
развитыми рыночными отношениями мер по поддержке конкуренции.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007
Aviv Nevo
Econometrica.
2001.
Vol. 69.
No. 2.
P. 307-342.
The ready-to-eat cereal industry is characterized by high concentration margins,
large advertising to sales ratios, and numerous introductions of new products. Previous
researchers have concluded that the ready-to-eat cereal industry is a classic example
of an industry with nearly collusive pricing behavior and intense non-price competition.
This paper empirically examines this conclusion. In particular, I estimate price-cost
margins importantly I am able empirically to separate these margins into three parts:
(1) that which is due to product differentiation; (2) that which is due to multi-product
firm pricing; and (3) that due to potential price collusion. The results suggest
that given the demand for different brands of cereal, the first two effects explain
most of the observed price-cost markups. I conclude that prices in the industry are
consistent with non-collusive pricing behavior to maintain a portfolio of differentiated
products influence the perceived quality of these products, and it is these two factors
that lead to high price-cost margins.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007
Timothy F. Bresnahan, Peter C. Reiss
Journal of Political Economy.
1991.
Vol. 99.
No. 5.
P. 977-1009.
This paper proposes an empirical framework for measuring the effects of entry in
concentrated markets. Building on models of entry in atomistically competitive markets,
the authors show how the number of producers in an oligopolistic market varies with
changes in demand and market competition. These analytical results structure the
authors' empirical analysis of competition in five retail and professional industries.
Using data on geographically isolated monopolies, duopolies, and oligopolies, they
study the relationship between the number of firms in a market, market size, and
competition. The authors' empirical results suggest that competitive conduct changes
quickly as the number of incumbents increases.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007
Aviv Nevo
RAND Journal of Economics.
2000.
Vol. 31.
No. 3.
P. 395-421.
Traditional merger analysis is difficult to implement when evaluating mergers in
industries with differentiated products. I discuss an alternative, which consists
of demand estimation and the use of a model of postmerger conduct to simulate the
competitive effects of a merger. I estimate a brand-level demand system for ready-to-eat
cereal using supermarket scanner data and use the estimates to (1) recover marginal
costs, (2) simulate postmerger price equilibria, and (3) compute welfare effects,
under a variety of assumptions. The methodology is applied to five mergers, two of
which occurred and for which I compare predicted to actual outcomes.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007
Patrick L. Bajari, Ali Hortaçsu
RAND Journal of Economics.
2003.
Vol. 34.
No. 2.
P. 329-55.
Internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most
successful forms of electronic commerce. We examine a unique dataset of eBay coin
auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior. We first document
a number of empirical regularities. We then specify and estimate a structural econometric
model of bidding on eBay. Using our parameter estimates from this model, we measure
the extent of the winner's curse and simulate seller revenue under different reserve
prices.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007
Ariel Pakes, Steven T. Berry, James A. Levinsohn
Econometrica.
1995.
Vol. 63.
No. 4.
P. 841-890.
This paper develops techniques for empirically analyzing demand and supply in differentiated
product markets and then applies these techniques to the U.S. automobile industry.
The authors' framework enables one to obtain estimates of demand and cost parameters
for a class of oligopolistic differentiated products markets. These estimates can
be obtained using only widely available product-level and aggregate consumer-level
data, and they are consistent with a structural model of equilibrium in an oligopolistic
industry. Applying these techniques, the authors obtain parameters for essentially
all autos sold over a twenty-year period.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007
Steven T. Berry, Ariel Pakes, James A. Levinsohn
Journal of Political Economy.
2004.
Vol. 112.
No. 1.
P. 68-105.
In this paper, we exploit new sources of cross-sectional data to estimate a detailed
product-level demand system for new passenger vehicles. We use four data sources:
on the characteristics of products, on the attributes of the U.S. population of households,
on the match between the first and second vehicle choices of the household, and on
the match between households attributes and first choice vehicles. We show that these
data solve some, but not all, of the traditional problems in estimating differentiated
products demand systems and indicate which data sources are important for which problem.
The data is rich enough to reveal a rather complex substitution pattern, requiring
a quite general modeling framework. Together the data and model make a detailed analysis
of industry demand possible.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007
Severin Borenstein, Nancy L. Rose
Journal of Political Economy.
1994.
Vol. 102.
No. 4.
P. 653-683.
The authors study dispersion in the prices an airline charges to different passengers
on the same route. This variation in fares is substantial: the expected absolute
difference in fares between two passengers on a route is 36 percent of the airline's
average ticket price. The pattern of observed price dispersion cannot easily be explained
by cost differences alone. Dispersion increases on routes with more competition or
lower flight density, consistent with discrimination based on customers' willingness
to switch to alternative airlines or flights. The authors argue that the data support
models of price discrimination in monopolistically competitive markets.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007
Joel Waldfogel, Steven T. Berry
RAND Journal of Economics.
1999.
Vol. 30.
No. 3.
P. 397-420.
In theory, free entry can lead to social inefficiency. We study the radio industry
in a first attempt to quantify this inefficiency. Using cross-sectional data on advertising
prices, the number of stations, and radio listening, we estimate the parameters of
listeners' decisions and of firms' profits. Relative to the social optimum, our estimates
imply that the welfare loss (to firms and advertisers) of free entry is 45% of revenue.
However, the free entry equilibrium would be optimal if the marginal value of programming
to listeners were about three times the value of marginal listeners to advertisers.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007
Steven T. Berry
RAND Journal of Economics.
1994.
Vol. 25.
No. 2.
P. 242-262.
This article considers the problem of "supply-and-demand" analysis on a cross section
of oligopoly markets with differentiated products. The primary methodology is to
assume that demand can be described by a discrete-choice model and that prices are
endogenously determined by price-setting firms. In contrast to some previous empirical
work, the techniques explicitly allow for the possibility that prices are correlated
with unobserved demand factors in the cross section of markets. The article proposes
estimation by "inverting" the market-share equation to find the implied mean levels
of utility for each good. This method allows for estimation by traditional instrumental
variables techniques.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007
Frank A. Wolak, Severin Borenstein, James B. Bushnell
American Economic Review.
2002.
Vol. 92.
No. 5.
P. 1376-1405.
We present a method for decomposing wholesale electricity payments into production costs, inframarginal competitive rents, and payments resulting from the exercise
of market power. Using data from June 1998 to October 2000 in California, we find significant departures from competitive pricing during the high demand summer months
and near-competitive pricing during the lower-demand months of the first two years. In summer 2000, wholesale electricity expenditures were $8.98 billion up from $2.04
billion in summer 1999. We find that 21 percent of this increase was due to production costs, 20 percent to competitive rents, and 59 percent to market power.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007
Kyle Bagwell, Susan Carleton Athey
RAND Journal of Economics.
2001.
Vol. 32.
No. 3.
P. 428-465.
We analyze collusion in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game, where prices are publicly
observed and each firm receives a privately observed, i.i.d. cost shock in each period.
Productive efficiency is possible only if high-cost firms relinquish market share.
In the most profitable collusive schemes, firms implement productive efficiency,
and high-cost firms are favored with higher expected market share in future periods.
If types are discrete, there exists a discount factor strictly less than one above
which first-best profits can be attained using history-dependent reallocation of
market share between equally efficient firms. We also analyze the role of communication
and side-payments.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007
Robert H. Porter, Kenneth Hendricks
American Economic Review.
1988.
Vol. 78.
No. 5.
P. 865-883.
This paper examines federal auctions for drain age leases on the Outer Continental
Shelf from 1959 to 1969. These are leases that are adjacent to tracts on which a
deposit has been discovered. The authors find that the data strongly support the
hypotheses that neighbor firms are better informed about the value of a lease than
nonneighbor firms; that neighbor firms coordinate their bidding decisions; and that
both types of firms bid strategically in accordance with the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
model for first-price, sealed-bid auctions with asymmetric information.
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Международное агентство по атомной энергии (МАГАТЭ) является ведущим мировым международным правительственным форумом научно-технического сотрудничества в области мирного использования ядерной технологии. Первый из двух предложенных сайтов является русскоязычным, второй - на английском языке (официальный сайт организации).
Обновлено: 09-12-2010
Комитет по техническому регулированию, стандартизации и оценке соответствия создан в 2004 году с целью консолидации усилий промышленных кругов, бизнес-сообщества и органов государственной власти по реализации реформы технического регулирования. Основными задачами Комитета являются обеспечение взаимодействия
Туровский Р.Ф. Центр и регионы: проблемы политических отношений. М.: Изд. дом ГУ ВШЭ, 2006. 400 с. [книга]
Опубликовано на портале: 17-02-2007
Научная монография посвящена проблемам политических отношений между центром и регионами в современном государстве и в России в частности. В монографии автором продолжена разработка методологии, позволяющей изучать эти отношения в рамках политической науки. На основе этой методологии проводится компаративное исследование территориально неоднородных государств и в их числе — России. Результаты исследования могут использоваться в практической деятельности органов власти и исследовательских организаций при разработке и принятии решений в сфере региональной и в целом — внутренней политики.
Для научных сотрудников и преподавателей, аспирантов и студентов, специализирующихся в области политологии и в частности — политической регионалистики, а также всех, кто интересуется вопросами региональной политики или занимается ими в своей практической деятельности.
За дополнительной информацией, пожалуйста, обращайтесь в Издательский дом ГУ-ВШЭ: http://id.hse.ru/index.php?page=prodaja
Для научных сотрудников и преподавателей, аспирантов и студентов, специализирующихся в области политологии и в частности — политической регионалистики, а также всех, кто интересуется вопросами региональной политики или занимается ими в своей практической деятельности.
За дополнительной информацией, пожалуйста, обращайтесь в Издательский дом ГУ-ВШЭ: http://id.hse.ru/index.php?page=prodaja
Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007
Ronald P. Wilder, Irwin B. Tucker
Journal of Industrial Economics.
1977.
Vol. 27.
P. 81-95.
Although industrial organization specialists generally list the degree of vertical
integration as one of the important elements of market structure, relatively little
empirical research has been devoted to measuring the extent of, and trends in, vertical
integration. M. A. Adelman's pioneering work in the mid-1950s and M. Gort's widely
cited research on diversification and integration are the primary exceptions of this
generalization. This paper reviews the concept of vertical integration and develops
a measures which is used to analyze the trend of vertical integration for the four-digit
manufacturing industries between 1954-1972 and for a sample of manufacturing firms
over the period of 1953-1973. We conclude by testing some hypotheses concerning determinants
of interfirm and interindustry differences in the trend of vertical integration.
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