Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 2025
Опубликовано на портале: 14-11-2003Marc Fleurbaey, Robert J. Gary-Bobo, Denis Maguain Journal of Public Economics. 2002. Vol. 84. No. 1. P. 113-150.
Abstract Autors consider a model of education planning in an economy in which agents differ in their costs of acquiring education. The agents' cost parameter, called `talent', is not observed. The principal is endowed with a fixed sum of money, with which two types of transfer can be made: in cash and in kind. The principal can finance transfers in kind, called `help', by means of schooling expenditures, which reduce the agent's education cost. The principal seeks to maximize a social welfare function which is a CES index of utility levels. Autors study the optimal allocation of individual education effort, schooling expenditures (help), and cash, under self-selection and budget constraints. Assuming first that the set of types is finite, and that help and effort are sufficiently substitutable, we find that individual education investment levels are an increasing function, and help is a decreasing function of talent. Utility levels cannot be equalized because of self-selection constraints. More aversion for inequality unequivocally leads to more inequality of educational achievements, and to more assistance through redistribution. This remains true in the limit, under strictly egalitarian preferences of the principal. The same qualitative properties hold in the general case of a continuum of types. Bunching at the lower end of the talent scale is a feature of the solution for sufficiently high degrees of inequality aversion.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-11-2003William O. Jr. Brown Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2001. Vol. 44. No. 2. P. 129-143.
This paper examines the relationship between faculty participation in university decision-making and university performance. Using an aggregated measure of faculty participation, McCormick and Meiners [The Journal of Law and Economics 31 (1989) 423] find that increased faculty control in decision-making is associated with lower levels of institutional performance. Building on the existing university governance literature, this paper argues that the optimal level of faculty participation varies by decision type. Disaggregating the data by faculty participation into different decision types produces results that are consistent with this hypothesis. Increased faculty participation may be good or bad; the effects vary by the type of decisions in which faculty participate.
Why Do Governments Operate Schools? [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-11-2003Michael Kremer, Андрей Сарычев
Abstract Around the world, education is overwhelmingly publicly provided. This paper argues that democratic societies will prefer that education be publicly provided, rather than simply publicly financed, since under a voucher system, parents may send their children to schools teaching ideologies that are similar to their own. Over a series of generations, this leads to a more ideologically polarized society. There may be two steady states: one in which an ideologically homogeneous society votes for a public education system, thus maintaining ideological homogeneity, and another in which a more ideologically diverse society votes for school choice, thus maintaining ideological diversity. A quick survey of the empirical evidence suggests that school choice contributes to ideological and cultural segregation, but that the extent to which this creates costly conflict varies among societies.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-11-2003Gianni De Fraja Review of Economic Studies. 2002. Vol. 69. No. 2. P. 437-466.
This paper studies the education policy chosen by a utilitarian government. In the model, households differ in their income and in their children’s ability; income is observed by the government, but ability is private information. Households can use private education, but cannot borrow to finance it. The government can finance education with income tax, but at the cost of blunting the individuals’ incentive to exert labour market effort. The optimal education policy we derive is elitist: it increases the spread between the educational achievement of the bright and the less bright individuals, compared to private provision. It is also such that the education received by less bright individuals depends positively on their parental income. Finally, the optimal education policy is input regressive, in the sense of Arrow (1971, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 38, 175–208): households with higher income and brighter children contribute less in tuition fees towards the cost of the education system than households with lower income and less bright children.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-11-2003Peter Bearse, Gerhard Glomm, B. Ravikumar European Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 44. No. 4-6. P. 904-915.
Abstract We use computational experiments to study the impact of means-tested education vouchers on the level and distribution of educational expenditures. Our benchmark is a regime where public and private schools coexist. Our means-tested voucher regime is one where households with lower incomes receive a larger voucher. Both the level of funding and the allocation of vouchers by income are endogenously determined by sequential majority voting. We examine the effect on educational expenditures of switching from a mixed public/private education regime to a means-tested voucher regime or to a uniform voucher regime where all households receive the same voucher. We find that: (i) Under means-tested vouchers, public funding for education is the smallest but average educational expenditure is the largest; (ii) inequality of educational resources is smaller under means-tested than that under uniform vouchers or the mixed regime; (iii) the `poor' and the `rich' households prefer means testing to either the mixed or uniform regime.