Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 22246
Опубликовано на портале: 14-12-2002Вадим Валерьевич Радаев Знание - сила. 1998.
Сегодня слова о российском "среднем классе" начинают мелькать все чаще и чаще. При этом говорящие о нем делятся в целом на два больших лагеря. Первые сетуют на то, что "средний класс" все никак не появится, и усматривают в этом трагедию реформенной России. Вторые утверждают, что "средний класс" уже сформировался, но мы просто не определили пока его границ и "штатного состава". Что же скрывается за красивой вывеской "Добро пожаловать в средний класс!", кто принадлежит к среднему классу (или надеется принадлежать)? Да и о "середине" ли вообще идет речь? Мы говорим "средний", а подразумеваем нечто большее. В рассуждениях слышится намек на удачное решение некой крупной проблемы, затрагивающей экономику, политику и социальную сферу. Однако в чем суть этой проблемы?
Опубликовано на портале: 12-12-2002Michael Hout, Clem Brooks, Jeff Manza American Sociological Review. 1995. Vol. 60. No. 6. P. 805-828.
We present evidence of a historic realignment in the relationship between class and voting behavior in U.S. presidential elections in the postwar period. We take advantage of recent advances in class analysis and statistical methodology to introduce a distinction between "traditional" class voting and "total" class voting. Neither shows a decline in the postwar era. The realignment occurred since 1968, as professionals and nonmanagerial white-collar workers moved from voting for Republicans to supporting Democratic presidential candidates. Stronger support for Republicans among the self-employed and among managers has more than offset the shift of professionals and nonmanagerial white-collar workers to the Democrats. Skilled blue-collar workers have become volatile, moving away from their historic support for the Democratic Party without firmly attaching themselves to the Republican Party. Significant class differences in voter turnout also contribute to the total association between class and voting outcomes.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-12-2002Kim Quaile Hill, Jan E. Leighley American Journal of Political Science. 1996. Vol. 40. No. 3. P. 787-804.
Research on historical and contemporary American party systems suggests how political party and party system attributes are relevant to class-specific mobilization. The more liberal and competitive the Democratic party in a state, the greater the mobilization of lower-class voters. Liberal and competitive Democratic parties will enhance turnout of the lower classes more than that of other classes. The latter relationships will be stronger in off year elections than in presidential elections. Pooled time-series and cross-sectional analyses of turnout are conducted by social class, state, and year for 1978 through 1990. The first two hypotheses about party attributes and class-specific mobilization are strongly supported, but only in presidential election years.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-12-2002Nan Dirk De Graaf, Paul Nieuwbeerta, Anthony F. Heath American Journal of Sociology. 1994. Vol. 100. No. 4. P. 997-1027.
The authors test several hypotheses about the impact of intergerational class mobility on political party preferences. Test using cross-national data sets representing Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, and the United States over the period 1964-90 suggest a process of acculturation to the class of destination. The authors hypothesized that a class with a high degree of demographic identity influences newcomers more than a class with low demographic identity does and that, the more left-wing inflow there is into a class, the more likely the immobile members are to have left-wing political preferences. The data did not confirm these hypotheses. A macro analysis does, however, show that the level of class voting is weakened by a compositional mobility effect.
How to compare apples and oragnes: Poverty measurement based on different definitions of consumption [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 12-12-2002Jean Olson Lanjouw, Peter Lanjouw Review of Income and Wealth. 2001. Vol. 47. No. 2.
Poverty rates calculated on the basis of household consumption expenditures are routinely compared across countries and time. The surveys which underlie these comparisons typically differ in the types of food and non-food expenditures included, often in ways which are easily overlooked by analysts. With several examples we demonstrate that these commonly occurring variations in expenditures definitions can give rise to marked differences in poverty rates where there are no real differences in well-being. We show that one approach to calculating poverty lines, used with headcount measurement of poverty, can allow comparisons based on data with different definitions of consumption. In addition to allowing comparative poverty analysis using existing survey data, the results suggest that poverty monitoring could be done effectively at lower cost by alternating detailed expenditures surveys with far more abbreviated surveys.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-12-2002Branko Milanovic, Shlomo Yizhaki Review of Income and Wealth. 2002. Vol. 48. No. 2.
Using the national income/expenditure distribution data from 111 countries, we decompose total inequality between the individuals in the world, by continents and regions. We use Yitzhakis Gini decomposition which allows for an exact breakdown of the Gini. We find t hat Asia is the most heterogeneous continents; between-country inequality is much more important than inequality in incomes within countries. At the other extreme is Latin America where differences between the countries are small, but inequalities within the countries are large. Western Europe/North America is fairly homogeneous both in terms of countries mean incomes and income differences between individuals. If we divided the world population into three groups: The rich (those with incomes greater than Italys mean income), the poor (those with income less than Western countries poverty lie), and the middle class, we find that there are only 11 percent of people who are world middle class; 78 percent are poor, and 11 percent are rich.