Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 444
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008Gregory Jackson, A. Moerke Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2008. Vol. 13. No. 3. P. 2005.
Germany and Japan are often seen deviating from an economic model of shareholder control and thereby as being similar by virtue of their mutual contrast with the US. Given the common challenges for bank-based and stakeholder-oriented models of corporate governance, Germany–Japan comparison seems particularly timely. This article provides an introductory overview and analysis for the Special Issue by comparing recent developments in corporate law reform, banking and finance, and employment in Germany and Japan. While rejecting arguments for international convergence, we discuss this evidence of simultaneous continuity and change in corporate governance as a potential form of hybridisation of national models or renegotiation of stakeholder coalitions in German and Japanese firms. One consequence is the growing diversity of firm-level corporate governance practices within national systems.
Strategy meets institutions: The transformation of management-labor relations at Deutsche Telekom and NTT [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008Mari Sako, Gregory Jackson Industrial & Labor Relations Review. 2006. Vol. 59. No. 3. P. 347-366.
This comparison of labor-management relations at Deutsche Telekom (DT) and NTT Group (formerly Nippon Telephone and Telegraph) demonstrates the value of considering both institutions and strategic decision-making to understand the interaction between companies and unions. As corporations diversify, multi-divisional or holding company structures emerge, but the degree of diversity introduced in employment relations within the corporate group depends on the interaction between corporate strategy and the strategy of organized labor. The authors' field research, based on interviews with managers and labor leaders, shows that despite a broadly similar corporate strategy of diversification by DT and NTT after the liberalization of telecommunication markets, employment relations became more decentralized-both for unions and for works councils-within the DT group than within the NTT group. This difference in outcomes is explained by the relative power and strategic choices of labor and management, rather than by constraints and opportunities specific to the existing national institutions.
Understanding an emergent diversity of corporate governance and organizational architecture: an essentiality-based analysis [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008Masahiko Aoki, Gregory Jackson Industrial and Corporate Change. 2008. Vol. 17. No. 1. P. 1-27.
This article proposes a simple framework for understanding an emergent diversity of linkages between corporate governance (CG) and organizational architecture (OA). It distinguishes discreet modes of their linkage by different combinatorial patterns between three basic assets: managers human assets (MHA), workers human assets (WHA), and non-human assets (NHA). Using the concept of essentiality of human assets proposed by Hart (1995) and distinguished from that of complementarities, we first propose a new characterization of four known modes of CG-OA linkage: three traditional (Anglo-American, German, and Japanese) and one relatively new (Silicon Valley) models. Then we present empirical evidences of emergent diversity of CG-OA linkages in Japan, which is somewhat at odds with the old Japanese model. We interpret its emergent dominant mode as the path-dependent evolution of a new pattern of essentiality between human assets, made viable by lessening of institutional-complementarity-constraints, which surrounded the traditional Japanese model. We argue that this new mode interpreted in terms of essentiality may have broader applicability beyond Japanese context.
An organizational approach to comparative corporate governance: Costs, contingencies, and complementarities [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008Ruth Aguilera, Gregory Jackson, Igor Filatotchev, Howard Gospel Organization Science. 2008. Vol. 19. No. 3. P. 475-492 .
This paper develops an organizational approach to corporate governance and assesses the effectiveness of corporate governance and implications for policy. Most corporate governance research focuses on a universal link between corporate governance practices (e. g., board structure, shareholder activism) and performance outcomes, but neglects how interdependencies between the organization and diverse environments lead to variations in the effectiveness of different governance practices. In contrast to such closed systems approaches, we propose a framework based on open systems approaches to organizations, which examines these organizational interdependencies in terms of the costs, contingencies, and complementarities of different corporate governance practices. These three sets of organizational factors are useful in analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance in diverse organizational environments. We also explore the impact of costs, contingencies, and complementarities on the effectiveness of different governance aspects through the use of stylized cases and discuss the implications for different approaches to policy such as soft law or hard law.
Comparing capitalisms: understanding institutional diversity and its implications for international business [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008Gregory Jackson, Richard Deeg Journal Of International Business Studies. 2008. Vol. 39. No. 4. P. 540-561.
This paper examines the role of institutional analysis within the field of international business (IB) studies. Within IB, institutions matter, but the view of institutions tends to be "thin", utilizing summary indicators rather than detailed description, and thus approaches institutions as unidimensional ''variables" that impact on particular facets of business activity. This paper argues that IB research would be usefully advanced by greater attention to comparing the topography of institutional landscapes and understanding their diversity. A number of alternative case-based approaches are outlined that draw on a growing "comparative capitalisms" literature in sociology and political science. The paper develops a number of empirical examples to show the utility and limits of these approaches for IB scholars.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008Gregory Jackson
Ред.: Masahiko Aoki, Hideaki Miyajima
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 0199284512, 416 с.
This book uses comparative institutional analysis to explain differences in national economic performance. Countries have their own rules for corporate governance and they have different market arrangements; and these differences in rules and organization affect the way firms behave. Countries also tend to develop conventions of organizational architechture of firms, whether their hierarchies are functional, horizontal, or decentralized. This affects the way in which they process information, and information management is increasingly seen as being of crucial importance to a firm's performance. Aoki accords more importance to these factors than to the factors conventionally used in applying a neoclassical model of economic efficiency. He applies game theory, contract theory, and information theory. By describing the rules and norms in Japan, the USA, and the transitional economies, Aoki shows how firms can achieve competitive advantage in international markets if these conventions and rules are well suited to the industrial sector in which the firms operate. He is particularly concerned with how Japan, with its main bank and lifelong employment systems, as well as information-sharing firm organizational structure, might reform its institutions to maintain competitive advantage in the world economy.
Corporate Governance and International Business. Strategy, Performance and Institutional Change [книги]
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008Ред.: Gregory Jackson, Roger Strange
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, 2008, 336 с.
Corporate governance has not, until recently, been a major topic for international business scholars. Corporate Governance and International Business, however, brings together a number of leading scholars and pioneering pieces of research in order to demonstrate that corporate governance and international business are clearly linked. By solving principle-agent problems and fostering different forms of stakeholder investment, it illustrates how corporate governance influences the attractiveness of host countries to inward investors, as well as the internationalization strategies of multinational enterprises themselves. Drawing on a number of different disciplinary approaches and methodological styles, the papers in this book also explore how international investors and the activities of multinational enterprises influence the institutional diversity of corporate governance around the world through novel patterns of diffusion and adaptation.
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner, John W Cioffi Mitbestimmung. 2005. Vol. 51. No. 8. P. 58-61.
In almost all Western industrialised countries, shareholders and supervisory bodies are now being given greater rights. Company takeovers are becoming easier, minority shareholders are receiving greater protection and transparency provisions are being enhanced. Why is it the Social Democratic parties that are championing these pro-shareholder reforms?
Corporate Governance in Transition: Ten Empirical Findings on Shareholder Value and Industrial Relations in Germany. [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner MPIfG, Discussion Paper. 2001. No. 01/5.
Within the context of debates over national “varieties” of capitalism, this paper discusses the shareholder value orientation of the 40 largest listed German companies. Three dimensions of shareholder value are distinguished: the communicative dimension, the operative dimension and the dimension of managerial compensation. A shareholder value index compiling data on accounting, investor relations, variable top-management compensation and the implementation of profitability goals makes it possible to compare the shareholder orientations of the companies. The shareholder value phenomenon is explained first by the exposure to markets – the international product market, capital market pressures and the market for corporate control – and, secondly, by internal developments – changing management careers, increasing management compensation and reduced monitoring by banks and corporate networks – which cause external impulses to increase shareholder value to fall on fertile ground. Conflicts over shareholder orientation result in changing coalitions between shareholders, management, and employees. Shareholder value does not make companies opt out of central collective agreements or endanger the existence of employees’ codetermination, but it does lead to more market-driven industrial relations.
Corporate Governance and Employees in Germany: Changing Linkages, Complementarities, and Tensions [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner, Gregory Jackson, Antje Kurdelbusch RIETI Discussion Paper. 2004. No. 04-E-008.
This article examines institutional linkages between corporate governance and labour management in Germany. German corporate governance was characterised by the importance of banks, ownership concentration, long-term investment, and stable corporate networks. This system displayed important complementarities with stable long-term employment, investment in worker training, flexible quality production, low variability and dispersion in pay, and cooperative industrial relations during the post-war period. Since the mid-1990s, corporate governance has changed dramatically – a decline in the role of banks, the unwinding of corporate networks, the rise of foreign and institutional investors, en emerging market for corporate control, and changing careers and compensation of top managers. The paper investigates the resulting introduction of shareholder-value management practices and their impact on employees in large German companies. The findings show that these changes are related to the shrinking of stable core employment and the growth of variable pay. However, such tensions with shareholder value management have not undermined employee codetermination and collective bargaining institutions. Both play an important mediating role between capital market pressures and employment outcomes. The implications for the German “model” of corporate governance are discussed.
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner MPIfG, Discussion Paper. 2007. No. 7/12.
This paper suggests a two-dimensional concept of nonliberal capitalism: coordinated capitalism (as described in the varieties of capitalism framework) and organized capitalism. While the coordination function of institutions canalizes individual maximization strategies of firms in order to adjust for collective action problems, the organization function transcends maximization strategies and adjusts them to collective interests beyond maximization. Political economies are highly organized when firms are not only the private business of owners and insiders but, in addition, quasi-public infrastructures and, therefore, highly constrained in their economic decisions by institutionally sanctioned collective interests (such as sectoral interests, class interests, or political interests). I construct an index on organized capitalism by combining data on ownership structures, board level codetermination, the density of employers’ associations and trade union density in order to allow for comparison between varying extents of coordination and organization in 20 OECD countries. The German example is used to demonstrate the analytical usefulness of the coordination–organization distinction in qualitative terms. The distinction allows for differentiation between two forms of liberalization: declining coordination and disorganization.
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Ред.: Andrew Pendleton, Howard Gospel
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 400 с.
This book is about the relationship between corporate governance regimes and labor management. It examines how finance and governance influence employment relationships, work organization, and industrial relations by means of a comparative analysis of Anglo-American, European and Japanese economies. The starting point is the distinction widely found in the corporate governance, business systems, and political economy literature between countries dominated by 'shareholder value' conceptions of corporate governance and those characterized by 'stakeholder' regimes. By drawing on a wide range of countries, the book is able to demonstrate the complexities of corporate governance arrangements and to present a more precise and nuanced exploration of the linkages between governance and labor management. Each country-based chapter provides an analysis of the evolution and key characteristics of corporate governance and then links this to labor management institutions and practices. The chapters cover the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain, with each written by a leading academic expert in the field. By providing a historical review of the evolution of national systems, the contributors provide judicious evaluations of the current state and future directions of national governance and labor relations systems. Overall, the book goes beyond the 'complementaries' between governance and labor management systems identified in recent literature, and attempts to identify casual relationships between the two. It shows how labor management institutions and practices may influence finance and corporate governance systems, as well as vice versa. The contributions to this book illuminate current debates about the determinants of corporate governance, the convergence of national 'varieties of capitalism', and the impact of corporate governance on managerial behavior. The book highlights the complexities of corporate governance systems and refines the distinction between market/outsider and relational insider systems.
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner, Jurgen Beyer West European Politics. 2003. Vol. 26. No. 4. P. 179-198.
Assesses corporate governance in Germany in the 1990s. Changes in corporate governance; Role of social responsibility on entrepreneurship; Reorientation towards investment banking.
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner, Lothar Krempel Competition and Change. 2004. Vol. 8. No. 4. P. 339-356.
One of the key features of the German model of capitalism is a dense network of relationships between large companies, often referred to as "Deutschland AG" (Germany Incorporated) in pub-lic discussions. This article analyzes the structure, history of, and current developments in the German company network. What kind of network structure did the largest German companies establish? In which stages did it evolve? Is it eroding? And, if so, why?
European Integration and the Clash of Capitalisms. Political Cleavages over Takeover Liberalization [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner, Helen Callaghan Comparative European Politics. 2005. Vol. 3. No. 3. P. 307-332.
Twenty years after the European Commission’s White Paper on the completion of the internal market, the integration of national markets for corporate control continues to lag behind the removal of barriers to trade in goods and services. To what extent does the protracted political battle over legal harmonization in this area reflect a clash of interests between liberal and coordinated national varieties of capitalism? To find out, we map the distribution of political support for liberal takeover rules within and across countries by analyzing a roll call vote on the takeover directive in the European Parliament in July 2001. Our data shows that, in line with the clash-of-capitalisms hypothesis, nationality did trump party group position on a left-right axis as a predictor of delegates’ attitudes toward takeover regulation. Given the increasing interference of EU-level legislative initiatives with the regulatory pillars of coordinated market economies, and the accession of ten new Eastern European member states, we expect the salience of the clash-of-capitalisms cleavage to increase in the near future.
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner, Gregory Jackson European Management Review. 2006. Vol. 3. No. 3. P. 142-155.
Degrees of shareholder orientation among companies differ across countries as well as over time. Markets for corporate control are important elements of corporate governance regimes that affect such orientations. German corporate governance has often been described as a bank-oriented, blockholder, or stakeholder model where markets for corporate control play no significant role. This case study of the hostile takeover of Mannesmann AG by Vodafone in 2000 demonstrates how systemic changes during the 1990s have eroded past institutional barriers to takeovers. The emergence of a market for corporate control cannot be understood by looking at takeover regulation in isolation. Rather, takeover markets rely on a whole set of complementary institutions, social practices, and predominant interpretations, such as banking strategies, codetermination practices, company regulation, and business ideologies. A limited, but significant segment of German corporations are now subjected to a market for corporate control.
The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism: Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance Reform. [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner, John W Cioffi Politics & Society. 2006. Vol. 34. No. 4. P. 463-502.
A striking paradox underlies corporate governance reform during the past fifteen years: center-left political parties have pushed for pro-shareholder corporate governance reforms, while the historically pro-business right has generally resisted them to protect established forms of organized capitalism, concentrated corporate stock ownership, and managerialism. Case studies of Germany, France, Italy, and the United States reveal that center-left parties used corporate governance reform to attack the legitimacy of existing political economic elites, present themselves as pro-growth and pro-modernization, strike political alliances with segments of the financial sector, and appeal to middle-class voters. Conservative parties’ established alliances with managers constrained them from endorsing corporate governance reform.
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner Comparative Politics. 2007. Vol. 39. No. 4. P. 401-420.
Why do German Social Democrats opt for more corporate governance liberalization than the Christian Democrats, although in terms of the distributional outcomes of such reforms the situation should be reversed? This empirical puzzle seems to contradict insights from comparative political economy and the varieties of capitalism approach, in particular. Social Democrats and trade unions adopted their liberal attitude to company regulation after World War II. In the 1970s competition policy was introduced to make Keynesian macroeconomic policy work. Since the 1990s labor favored shareholder-oriented reforms because they helped employee representatives in conflicts over managerial control. The analysis has implications for partisan theory, institutional complementarity, and conflict models in comparative political economy.
Wer beherrscht die Unternehmen? Shareholder Value, Managerherrschaft und Mitbestimmung in Deutschland [книги]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner
Frankfurt am Mein: Campus, 2003, 300 с.
Shareholder Value versus Wertschöpfung Wandel der politischen Ökonomie in Deutschland Die Praxis der Unternehmensführung ist in Deutschland seit den neunziger Jahren zunehmend aktionärsorientiert. Martin Höpner untersucht am Beispiel der vierzig größten deutschen Kapitalgesellschaften Ursachen und Konsequenzen dieser Entwicklung. Deutsche Großunternehmen bemühen sich in den neunziger Jahren verstärkt, ihre Unternehmenskontrollsysteme an den Interessen der Aktionäre auszurichten. In der öffentlichen Debatte wird dieser Vorgang unter dem Schlagwort »Shareholder Value« diskutiert – ein Begriff, der eine Unternehmenspolitik bezeichnet, die auf die Bedienung der Finanzinteressen der Aktionäre und damit auf die Steigerung der Aktienkurse zielt. Doch die Aktienkurse spiegeln nicht die Wertschöpfung des Unternehmens, sondern nur deren Verteilung wider. Aus der Sicht von z.B. Arbeitnehmern, Zulieferern, Abnehmern und Endverbrauchern ist der Shareholder Value quasi bedeutungslos, weil für diese Gruppen andere Unternehmenswerte von Belang sind. Martin Höpner diskutiert in seiner Untersuchung die Vereinbarkeit einer Shareholder-Value-Orientierung mit dem deutschen System der Arbeitsbeziehungen, das durch ein hohes Maß an Regulierung und Mitbestimmung gekennzeichnet ist. Er zeigt, dass aktionärsorientierte Unternehmensführung gerade nicht auf dauerhafte Steigerungen der Wertschöpfung (zum Beispiel durch Unternehmenswachstum) zielt, sondern auf dauerhafte Steigerungen des Aktionärsnutzens, der mit den Ansprüchen, die andere Gruppen an Unternehmen richten, durchaus in Konflikt geraten kann. Höpners wirtschaftssoziologische Studie interpretiert die zunehmende Managementorientierung an den Finanzinteressen der Aktionäre als einen Indikator dafür, dass sich in den zugrunde liegenden Spielregeln und Kräfteverhältnissen, unter denen die am Unternehmensgeschehen beteiligten Gruppen zusammentreffen, grundlegende Veränderungen vollzogen haben. Der Autor stellt seine Befunde in den Kontext der Theorie über Modelle des Kapitalismus und leistet so einen wichtigen Beitrag zur politisch-ökonomischen Theorie der gegenwärtigen Liberalisierungsprozesse.
National Institutions and High Tech Industries: A Varieties of Capitalism Perspective on the Failure of Germany’s “Neuer Markt” [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 17-11-2008Sigurt Vitols, Lutz Engelhardt WZB Discussion Paper. 2005. No. 2005-03.
One of the more prominent recent failures in institutional innovation in Germany was the Neuer Markt (1997-2003), a special segment of the Frankfurt stock exchange designed for high-growth companies. Based in part on insights from the law and economics approach to agency theory, which emphasizes transparency in financial reporting and shareholder rights, the Neuer Markt was an attempt to promote high-tech sectors through increasing the supply of risk capital in Germany. Proponents of the agency approach have suggested that the Neuer Markt failed because reporting requirements and shareholder protection were still inadequate, and have argued for even stricter financial regulation. This paper offers an alternative explanation for the failure of the Neuer Markt based on the Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) approach. This explanation focuses on the complementarities between financial markets and labor markets. Successful entrepreneurial companies require both capital and experienced managers and scientists willing to take higher risks in search of higher returns. Although the supply of risk-friendly capital increased briefly in the late 1990s in Germany, labor markets did not fundamentally change. In particular, mobility in the market for mid-career scientists and managers remains quite low, making it difficult for startups to attract the experienced knowledge workers they need to succeed.