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Что такое экономическая социология? Это не "междисциплинарные исследования". Это не "изучение социальных проблем в экономике". Это не проведение опросов населения. Это не маркетинговые исследования. Что же это? (подробнее...)
Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 444

Опубликовано на портале: 17-11-2008
Sigurt Vitols WZB Discussion Paper. 1995.  No. 95 – 309.
This paper analyzes the contribution of the German banking system to the modernization of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in industry. The simultaneous greater relative importance of and relatively high wages in German SMEs appear to be paradoxical in terms of dual labor market theory, which claims that lower wages and greater flexibility in the use of labor are important for helping small firms compensate for their constrained access to capital, R&D and skills resources relative to large firms. This paper suggests that the successful modernization of the German small firm sector despite pressure from below from industry-level wage bargaining and strong job protection can be attributed to support from above in terms of an institutional infrastructure helping small firms overcome the organizational deficiencies they face relative to large firms. The decentralized provision of long-term finance and sophisticated financial services for the modernization of SMEs is enabled by a three-tiered federalist form of corporatist organization in the cooperative and savings banks sectors, in which smaller banks at the bottom tier of the organization receive access to refinancing on capital markets and specialized services -- normally only available to large banks -- through the upper tiers of the banking organization.
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Опубликовано на портале: 17-11-2008
Sigurt Vitols WZB Discussion Paper. 1995.  No. 95-310 .
This paper critically examines the debate on corporate governance and the claim (often made in Anglo-American companies) that the close links between German banks and industry are primarily responsible for the longer-term investment strategies and greater quality competitiveness of German manufacturing. Instead, it is argued here that manufacturing investment and bank behavior must be examined within a broader system of economic governance. In particular, the regulation of labor markets is a key factor influencing company choices between price and quality-competitive strategies. The corporatist regulation of German labor markets has encouraged quality-competitive strategies by keeping labor costs out of competition to a greater extent than in the US, where a collapse in pattern bargaining in core manufacturing industries and the strategic use of bankruptcy was motivated by companies' attempts to gain a comparative price advantage on the basis of lower labor costs. This argument is supported through a case study of the restructuring of the steel industry in Germany and the US in the 1980s.
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Опубликовано на портале: 17-11-2008
Sigurt Vitols WZB Discussion Paper. 1995.  No. 95 – 311.
A widely held view is that, since the 1970s, the nation-state has suffered a significant reduction in its capacity to achieve national economic policy goals through the regulation of the financial system; as a result, national political economies are now characterized by a market-driven convergence towards financial systems dominated by privately-owned, internationally-active “financial supermarkets” with weak links to both industry and government. Through a comparison of Germany and Great Britain, this paper critically examines this thesis and poses the following two questions: (1) What implications do the lifting of capital and exchange controls and the reorientation of monetary policy to anti-inflationary policies have for the state’s capacity to regulate financial systems? and (2) What implications does this regulatory discretion (if any) have for industrial finance and the state's capacity to utilize the financial system to achieve microeconomic industrial policy goals? In response to these questions, it is demonstrated how the state has retained significant regulatory autonomy in ways which have significant consequences for industrial finance and industrial policy.
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Опубликовано на портале: 17-11-2008
Ред.: Bernhard Ebbinghaus, Philip Manow
London: Routledge, 2001, cерия "Routledge/Eui Studies in the Political Economy of Welfare, 3", 352 с.
This book challenges the popular thesis of a downward trend in the viability of welfare states in competitive market economies. With approaches ranging from historical case studies to cross-national analyses, the contributors explore various aspects of the relationships between welfare states, industrial relations, financial government and production systems. Building upon and combining comparative studies of both the varieties of capitalism and the worlds of welfare state regimes, the book considers issues such as the role of employers and unions in social policy, the interdependencies between financial markets and pension systems, and the current welfare reform process. Comparing Welfare Capitalism sheds new light on the tenuous relationship between social policies and market economies.
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Опубликовано на портале: 17-11-2008
Sigurt Vitols WZB Discussion Paper. 2001.  No. 01 - 302.
This paper examines the historical origins of the bank-based financial systems in Germany and Japan and the market-based financial system in the US. It critically examines the “timing of industrialization” (TOI) thesis, i.e. the assertion that variation in the current structure of financial systems can be explained by differences in the timing of the “take-off” phase of industrialization. The first major claim I make is that TOI overstates both the significance of bank-based finance for the rapid industrialization of Germany and Japan and the extent to which the financial systems really were different. Second, I argue that TOI understates the importance of different patterns of state regulation, particularly starting in the 1930s, for explaining postwar differences in the financial systems. The third claim I make is that differences in financial regimes are dependent not only upon the narrow issue of financial regulation but also on the nature of the regulation of labor, including welfare regimes.
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Опубликовано на портале: 17-11-2008
Sigurt Vitols WZB Discussion Paper. 2002.  No. 02 - 901.
One of the key features of both the German and Japanese postwar political economies is a bank-based financial system. In the 1980s bank-based systems were widely perceived to be superior to market-based systems like the US and UK in their ability to provide long-term "patient" capital to industry. Since the early 1990s, however, the bank-based financial systems in both Japan and Germany have faced serious challenges, to the extent that their fundamental viability vis-à-vis market-based systems is being questioned. This paper assesses the potential paths of development for these bank-based systems and argues that change in the two countries is poorly captured by the "convergence-divergence" dichotomy. The first point made is that an examination of changes in financial systems should start with an analysis of the "societal foundations" of bank-based systems. Bank-based systems rest not just on a set of financial regulatory practices but also on the institutions and behavior of the household, corporate and public sectors as savers and investors. The second point made in this paper is that, although public policy choices are often presented in terms of a stark dichotomy between "liberal" and "non-liberal" modes of regulation (the former associated with market-based systems, the latter with bank-based systems), in fact both Germany and Japan are struggling to find a successful combination or "hybrid" of the two types of financial regulation. A third and final point is that banks play important (if diminished) roles even in market-based systems. The ultimate form that the coexistence of banks and markets will take in Japan and Germany depends on the creativity and efforts of policymakers and the banks themselves. Those interested in institutional design should try to preserve a viable banking system for SMEs and the household sector while simultaneously promoting stable capital markets for larger companies and high-tech start-ups.
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Опубликовано на портале: 12-11-2008
Sigurt Vitols Industry and Innovation. 1997.  Vol. 4. No. 1. P. 15-36. 

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Опубликовано на портале: 12-11-2008
Sigurt Vitols Transfer. 2008.  No. 1. P. 27-43. 
This article contributes to the current battle over the character of the evolving European system of corporate governance. The claims of proponents of the shareholder value model, which has been hegemonic in European policy-making circles over the past decade, are subject to a critical examination. In particular, the claims of the governance superiority of private equity, one of the extreme expressions of the shareholder model, are shown not to hold empirically. The concept of the sustainable company is proposed as an alternative to the shareholder value model, both because of its explicit commitment to a multidimensional understanding of welfare, and because of its extension of worker participation beyond traditional trade union concerns.
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Опубликовано на портале: 12-11-2008
Steven Casper, Mark Lehrer, David Soskice Industry and Innovation. 2008.  Vol. 6. No. 1. P. 5 - 24. 
The paper explores the influence of institutional frameworks on the evolution of the German software and biotechnology sectors. It links institutional constraints to poor performance of German firms in high volume market niches characterized by turbulent technological change and substantial financial risk. However, German firms are prospering in software services and “platform technologies” in biotechnology. The company organizational structures and investment strategies needed to excel in these market segments provide a close “fit” with incentives created within the German economy.
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Опубликовано на портале: 12-11-2008
Sigurt Vitols Competition and Change. 2002.  Vol. 6. No. 3. P. 309-325. 
Discusses the transformation of the German chemical-pharmaceutical industry in relation to shareholder value, management culture and production regimes. Information on the Big Three German chemical companies in the postwar years; Factors influencing the shift in capital markets in the 1990s.
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Опубликовано на портале: 12-11-2008
Sigurt Vitols Economy and Society. 2001.  Vol. 30. No. 4. P. 553-564. 
Germany's bank-based financial system has been generally perceived as good at providing long-term debt finance to traditional industry but poor at supplying equity capital to high-tech start-ups. In 1997 a special segment of the Frankfurt stock exchange, the Neuer Markt, was founded to improve the supply of high-risk equity capital in Germany. The subsequent listing of over 300 companies on the Neuer Markt, many of them in technology-intensive sectors, has led to speculation that Germany is rapidly closing the gap with the US, the world leader in high technology. Contrary to this view, this article suggests that these companies have more in common with traditional German small and medium-sized companies (SMEs) than with the Silicon Valley model of governance and innovation.
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Опубликовано на портале: 12-11-2008
Sigurt Vitols Small Business Economics. 1998.  Vol. 10. No. 2. P. 79-91. 
In recent years there has been a vigorous revival of the long-standing debate about the "uniqueness" of German banks. To date little consensus has been reached; while some see few differences between the role of banks in Germany and in other countries, others claim that universal banks' equity shareholdings in and nomination of representatives to the boards of nonfinancial firms are the key institutional features driving the rest of the "German model" of long-term investment in high-quality, internationally competitive manufacturing. This article argues that the uniqueness of the German banking system lies (1) in its unusually high capacity to provide industrial finance in the form of long-term debt capital, and (2) in its avoidance of the "speculative boom-credit crunch" cycle experienced by almost every other advanced industrialized country in the 1980s and early 1990s. These two key characteristics are attributable to a regulatory framework which involves strict prudential regulation, access to long-term refinancing sources, and a federalist form of corporatism. Furthermore, the behavior of German banks must be analyzed within a broader institutional system of economic governance which includes corporatist labor market institutions and a relatively large and modern SME sector.
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Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
Andrei Shleifer Journal of Economic Perspectives. 1998.  Vol. 12. No. 4. P. 133-150. 

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Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 2000.  Vol. 55. No. 1. P. 1-33 . 
This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the "outcome model," dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According to the "substitute model," insiders interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model of dividends.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008
Edward Ludwig Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Economic Growth. 2004.  Vol. 9. No. 3. P. 271-303. 
We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, suggest that (a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, (b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and (c) subsequently improve their political institutions.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008
Juan C. Botero, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2004.  Vol. 119. No. 4. P. p1339-1382. 
We investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment, collective relations, and social security laws in 85 countries. We find that the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems, and that socialist, French, and Scandinavian legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries. However, the effects of legal origins are larger, and explain more of the variation in regulations, than those of politics. Heavier regulation of labor is associated with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment, especially of the young. These results are most naturally consistent with legal theories, according to which countries have pervasive regulatory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems.
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Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Financial Economics. 2008.  Vol. 88. No. 3. P. 430-465.. 
We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, that govern a specific self-dealing transaction. This theoretically grounded index predicts a variety of stock market outcomes, and generally works better than the previously introduced index of anti-director rights.
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Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 2002.  Vol. 57. No. 3. P. 1147-1170. 
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder.
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Law and Finance [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Political Economy. 1998.  Vol. 106. No. 6. P. 1113-1155. 
This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common-law countries generally have the strongest, and French-civil-law countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with German- and Scandinavian-civil-law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified shareholders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.
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Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Financial Economics. 2000.  Vol. 58. No. 1-2. P. 3-27. 
Recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and in the access of firms to external finance. A common element to the explanations of these differences is how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries, discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems.
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