Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 444
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Economic Literature. 2008. Vol. 46. No. 2. P. 285-332.
In the last decade, economists have produced a considerable body of research suggesting that the historical origin of a country's laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with economic outcomes. We summarize this evidence and attempt a unified interpretation. We also address several objections to the empirical claim that legal origins matter. Finally, we assess the implications of this research for economic reform.
The New Comparative Economics [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Simeon Djankov, Edward Ludwig Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Comparative Economics. 2003. Vol. 31. No. 4. P. 595-619.
In recent years, the field of comparative economics refocused on the comparison of capitalist economies. The theme of the new research is that institutions exert a profound influence on economic development. We argue that, to understand capitalist institutions, one needs to understand the basic tradeoff between the costs of disorder and those of dictatorship. We apply this logic to study the structure of efficient institutions, the consequences of colonial transplantation, and the politics of institutional choice.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Jonathan Charkham
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 460 с.
How should companies be organized? To whom should boards of directors be responsible--shareholders, or a wider group of stakeholders? In this fiercely competitive world we cannot judge our own system of corporate governance in isolation; it must bear comparison with the best. The second edition of this acclaimed and well-established book aims to do just that. Since publication of the first edition interest in corporate governance has greatly increased, codes have proliferated, and principles laid down nationally and internationally. In Keeping Good Company, the author describes developments in the system of corporate governance-both the business environment and the particular structures of company organization-in five major industrial countries: Germany, Japan, France, the USA and the UK. This second edition is fully revised, updated and expanded, and includes a new conclusion looking at a number of ongoing issues in corporate governance, and an appendix discussing the role of international organizations.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Franklin Allen Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 2005. Vol. 21. No. 2. P. 164-177 .
Most of the literature on corporate governance emphasizes that firms should be run in the interests of shareholders. This is an appropriate objective function when markets are perfect and complete. In many emerging economies this is not the case: markets are imperfect and incomplete. The first theme of the paper is that alternative firm objective functions, such as pursuing the interests of all stakeholders, may help overcome market failures. The second theme is that it is not necessarily optimal to use the law to ensure good corporate governance. Other mechanisms such as competition, trust, and reputation may be preferable.
Comparing Financial Systems [книги]
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Franklin Allen, Douglas Gale
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2000, 519 с.
Financial systems are crucial to the allocation of resources in a modern economy. They channel household savings to the corporate sector and allocate investment funds among firms; they allow intertemporal smoothing of consumption by households and expenditures by firms; and they enable households and firms to share risks. These functions are common to the financial systems of most developed economies. Yet the form of these financial systems varies widely. In the United States and the United Kingdom competitive markets dominate the financial landscape, whereas in France, Germany, and Japan banks have traditionally played the most important role. Why do different countries have such different financial systems? Is one system better than all the others? Do different systems merely represent alternative ways of satisfying similar needs? Is the current trend toward market-based systems desirable? Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale argue that the view that market-based systems are best is simplistic. A more nuanced approach is necessary. For example, financial markets may be bad for risk sharing; competition in banking may be inefficient; financial crises can be good as well as bad; and separation of ownership and control can be optimal. Financial institutions are not simply veils, disguising the allocation mechanism without affecting it, but are crucial to overcoming market imperfections. An optimal financial system relies on both financial markets and financial intermediaries.
Анализ рынков в современной экономической социологии / Отв. ред. В. В. Радаев, М. С. Добрякова ; сост., науч. ред. и авт. предисл. В. В. Радаев. 2-е изд. М.: Изд. дом ГУ ВШЭ, 2008. 423 с. [книга]
Опубликовано на портале: 03-06-2008
Книга представляет собой сборник ключевых современных работ (1990—2000 гг.), посвященных социологии рынков. Авторы статей — ведущие американские и европейские исследователи в области экономической социологии (M. Abolafia, P. Aspers, W. Baker, N. Biggart, P. Evans, M. Guillen, N. Fligstein, K. Knorr-Cetina, D. Slater, B. Uzzi и др.). В публикуемых работах, помимо различных объектов исследования, представлены разные методологические направления и аналитические подходы. Статьи предваряет обзор состояния социологии рынков, подготовленный научным редактором сборника В.В. Радаевым.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-05-2008Овсей Ирмович Шкаратан, Сергей Александрович Инясевский Общественные науки и современность. 2008. № 3. С. 111-122.
В связи с исследованием возможностей выхода России из состояния экономической отсталости, пребывания в качестве сырьевого придатка к постиндустриальным странам, образующим ядро современной мир-системы, авторы исходят из принципа активистского восприятия трансформационных процессов в российских экономике и обществе. Такой подход предполагает новое структурирование экономики в секторальном и отраслевом разрезах с выделением ее новых сегментов вне зависимости от статистической представительности в совокупном ВВП и совокупной численности рабочей силы. С учетом отставания национальной экономики и сосредоточения основной массы экономически активного населения не только в индустриальных, но и в доиндустриальных видах занятости, необходимо создание такой дифференциации отраслей по видам экономической деятельности, которая бы давала явное представление о перспективах развития экономики, ключевых точках роста, а следовательно, и об основных акторах новой экономики. Согласно разработанной авторами классификации, новая экономика основывается на следующих секторах: услуги производителям (трансакционный сектор), сектор производства знания, сектор производства информационных технологий (средств обработки и распространения информации), сектор распространения информации и культурных услуг. Основными акторами развития новой экономики являются информациональные производители, чья инновационность и креативность являются не свидетельством их передовых позиций в традиционных видах деятельности, а естественной компонентой их функциональности.
Опубликовано на портале: 23-04-2008Александр Викторович Петров Социологические исследования. 2007. № 8. С. 143-144.
Сообщение о проведении в Санкт-Петербургском государственном университете российско-китайского семинара: "Модели социального и политического развития России и Китая: сравнительный анализ, который состоялся в октябре 2006 г.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008Peter A. Hall, Kathleen Thelen
Paper prepared for presentation to the Europeanists Conference, Chicago, March 2006. Comparative political economists have become deeply interested in processes of institutional change, and especially in those taking place in response to the opening of world markets associated with ‘globalization’. They are asking a number of questions. When do the institutions of the political economy change? What factors drive change? Are changes in the international economy enforcing institutional convergence on the developed economies? We take up these issues with reference to one of the more influential frameworks devised to explain national differences in economic performance and policy, namely the ‘varieties of capitalism’ perspective now employed by a substantial number of scholars
An Epochal Change... but Uncertain Futures: The Japanese Capitalism in Crisis. A "Regulationist" Interpretation [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008Robert Boyer, Toshio Yamada CEPREMAP Working Papers. 2000. No. 2000-05.
This research summarizes the main findings of "Regulation" theory about the evolution of the Japanese economy since WWII and proposes an institutional interpretation of the crisis of the 90s. The company-ist compromise is the core of the whole institutional architecture via an original wage labour nexus, largely different from the American Fordist one. There is a clear hierarchy between the large corportation and sub-contractors. One observers a complementarity between the mode of governance of the firm and the main bank and finallybetween the industrial wselfare and the management of employment. A highly original "regulation" mode has allowed the implementation of a mass production and consumption economy, but this regime enters into crisis by its very success and this crisis is exacerbated by the impact of the financial bubble of the 90s. The paper surveys the transformation of the main institutional firms since the 90s and builds three scenarios based respectively upon: a large inertia of Japanese economic and political institutions; a quick adoption of typical market-led institutions under the pressure of financial market; or a new hybridization process that would concern banking and finance and not only the manufacturing industries, as was the case after WWII.
How to Control and Reward Managers? The Paradox of the 90s. From Optimal Contract Theory to a Political Economy Approach [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008Robert Boyer Research & Regulation Working Papers. 2005. No. 2005-1.
Why did CEOs remuneration exploded during the 90s and persisted to high levels, even after the bursting out of the Internet bubble? This article surveys the alternative explanations that have been given of this paradox mainly by various economic theories with some extension to political science, business administration, social psychology, moral philosophy, network analysis. Basically, it is argued that the diffusion of stock-options and financial market related incentives, that were supposed to discipline managers, have entitled them to convert their intrinsic power into remuneration and wealth, both at the micro and macro levels. This is the outcome of a de facto alliance of executives with financiers, who have thus exploited the long run erosion of wage earners’ bargaining power. At the company level, the power of top-managers derives from their control over financial information, and from a better knowledge than outsiders of the sources of company profitability. This power of top-managers is directly linked to the ability for a company to generate profits, via the complementarity of specific assets, at odds with the conventional neoclassical theory that assumes a cybernetic approach concerning the substitution of factors of production in response to the price signal of markets. Insider trading, the low sensitivity of CEOs compensation with respect to performance in large companies, the contradictory impact of mergers and acquisitions upon managers on one side shareholder on the other side, and the rarity of indexed stock-options are relevant empirical evidences of this intrinsic, micro founded, power of managers. Why financial scandals about excessive CEOs compensation took place at the end of the 90s and not before? A political economy approach complements the previous one and conveys the hypothesis that CEOs and CFOs have converted a part of their economic power into a political power, expressed at the society wide level. Generous stock-options grants derive from the impact of financial liberalisation, contemporary societies seem to accept more easily the widening of inequalities, whereas many governments tend to be pro-business: they lower the taxation of capital but they increase households taxation and weaken the redistributive role of tax and welfare systems. The article finally discusses the possible reforms that could reduce the probability and the adverse consequences of CEOs and top-managers opportunism: reputation, business ethic, legal sanctions, public auditing of companies, or shift from a shareholder to a stakeholder conception).
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008Robert Boyer Competition and Change. 2005. Vol. 9. No. 1. P. 7–47.
Why did CEO remuneration explode during the 1990s and persist at high levels, even after the Internet bubble burst? This article surveys the alternative explanations that have been given of this paradox, mainly by various economic theories with some extension to political science, business administration, social psychology, moral philosophy and network analysis. It is argued that the diffusion of stock options and financial market-related incentives, supposed to discipline managers, have entitled them to convert their intrinsic power into remuneration and wealth, both at micro and macro level. This is the outcome of a de facto alliance of executives with financiers, who have exploited the long-run erosion of wage earners’ bargaining power. The article also discusses the possible reforms that could reduce the probability and the adverse consequences of CEO and top-manager opportunism: reputation, business ethic, legal sanctions, public auditing of companies, or a shift from a shareholder to a stakeholder conception.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008Robert Boyer PSE Working Papers. 2006. No. 2006-21.
This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that the dynamism of employment is always contradictory to the enforcement of some forms of security for workers. Contemporary theorizing now recognizes the specificity of the wage-labour nexus. Consequently, minimum security is required for good economic performance by firms and national economies. A comparative analysis of OECD countries shows that the extended security promoted by welfare systems has not been detrimental to innovation, growth and job creation. Developing countries cannot immediately catch up with the emerging standards of flexicurity but the methodology of employment diagnosis might help them in designing security/flexibility configurations tailored according to their domestic economic specialization, social values and political choices.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008Robert Boyer PSE Working Papers. 2007. No. 2007-43.
This article starts from the limits of the policies that assume a significant de-connection between antipoverty strategies and the logic of the growth regime and that mainly rely upon market mechanisms. By contrast, a branch of the new institutional economics argues that a complete set of coordinating mechanisms is constitutive of really existing economies and that they are more complementary than substitute. The Institutional Complementarity Hypothesis (ICH) may be useful for analyzing simultaneously the antipoverty policies and the viability of growth regimes. The different brands of capitalism are the outcome of complementary institutions concerning competition, labor market institutions, welfare and innovation systems. Generally, such configurations cannot be emulated by poor developing countries, but reviewing the preliminary findings of the UNRISD country case studies suggests some common features to all successful experiments. Basically, antipoverty policies are efficient when they create the equivalent of virtuous circles within which growth entitles antipoverty programs and conversely these programs sustain the speed and stability of growth. Two methods are proposed in order to detect possible complementarities and design accordingly economic policies: the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) on one side, national growth diagnosis on the other side. A special attention is devoted to the timing of policies and the role of policy regimes. A brief conclusion wraps up the major findings and proposes a research agenda.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008Robert Boyer PSE Working Papers. 2005. No. 2005-39.
Contrary to the prognosis derived from the variety of capitalism literature, since the mid-90s the significant restructuring of large German corporations in the direction of shareholder value seems to have been compatible with the persistence of a genuine configuration of industrial relations, including co-determination at the firm level. This article investigates whether this is a long lasting compatibility and tests various research programs in institutional economics and thus explores the consequences alternative hypotheses about institutional complementarity or hierarchy, comparative institutional analysis, comparative historical analysis, hybridization and finally régulation theory. Even if the process is highly uncertain, one major conclusion emerges: the old German model is probably irreversibly transformed and is evolving towards an unprecedented configuration, with only mild and distant relations to a typical liberal brand of capitalism.
The Political in the Era of Globalization and Finance: Focus on Some Régulation School Research [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008Robert Boyer International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. 2000. Vol. 24. No. 2. P. 274-322.
This article analyses macroeconomic developments of the 1990s in the light of recent propositions from régulation theory. These are concerned, firstly, with taking into account interdependencies between the political and economic spheres, with notions of the complementary nature and hierarchy of institutions, with the endogeneity of transition from growth to crisis and with the position of the nation-state in a situation of greater international interdependence. Thus, they go on to demonstrate that ‘globalization’ relates, above all, to finance and is more the expression of a political project than of economic determinism. The extension of market adjustments has simply not led to the recovery of dynamic efficiency. The viability of various forms of capitalism depends greatly on the international configuration and on the political strategies of the various governments. Finally, the viability of a finance-dominated or, perhaps, a property-owning growth regime may prove problematic, as much from a theoretical as from an empirical point of view.
Coherence, Diversity, and the Evolution of Capitalisms—The Institutional Complementarity Hypothesis [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008Robert Boyer Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review. 2005. Vol. 2. No. 1. P. 43-80.
What are the forces that make relatively and transitorily coherent the institutional configurations of capitalism? In response to the literature on the variety of capitalisms, this article investigates the relative explanatory power of various hypotheses: institutional complementarity, institutional hierarchy, coevolution, simple compatibility or isomorphism. Compatibility is too often confused with complementarity and it is frequently an ex-post recognition, rarely an ex ante design. Both hybridization and endometabolism are the driving forces in the transformation of institutional configurations. Uncertainty and the existence of some slack in the coupling of various institutions are key features that call for the mixing of various methodologies in order to detect complementarities. This framework is then used in order to show that three distinct institutional complementarities are at the origin of the more successful national economies since the 90s. Thus, institutional diversity is being recreated and the existence of complementarities plays a role in this process.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008Robert Boyer CEPREMAP Working Papers. 2000. No. 2000-09.
Why is it that Germany and Japan, economic miracles of the 60's are nowadays perceived as ailing capitalisms and should they adopt a typical American market led capitalism? Can the German and Japanese Social Systems of Innovation (SSI) survive into the next century? Does the opposition between embedded and market-led capitalism provide a satisfactory interpretation? The answers to the three previous questions are respectively no, yes, and no. The paper first provides an institutional and statistical analysis of the Social System of Innovation of major OECD countries, then builds a Kaldorian endogenous growth model which captures three sources for technical change, and finally, uses this framework in order to elaborate some scenarios for the transformation of the Japanese and German economies.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008Robert Boyer Socio-Economic Review. 2004. Vol. 2. No. 1. P. 1-32.
Whereas the American case may hint that product and labour market deregulation, venture capital and NASDAQ are necessary for the success of a technological led growth, the international comparison suggests the coexistence of at least three successful configurations. Deregulated economies explore a science pushed innovation, along with external labour flexibility, significant inequality in terms of competences. But social democratic countries develop a cooperative approach to the knowledge based economy: rather homogenous educational level, life long learning, negotiation by social partners of the consequence of innovation, collectively organized labour mobility. There is a third configuration for some catching-up economies that use information technology as a method for leapfrogging: labour markets remain largely institutionalised and regulated, without exerting adverse impact upon macroeconomic performance.