Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 596
How Does Ownership Structure Affect Firm Value? A Comparison Using Different Corporate Governance Systems [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Alberto Miguel, Julio Pindado, Chabela de la Torre SSRN Working Papers. 2003.
This paper studies how the main institutional factors characterizing corporate governance systems around the world affect the relationship between ownership structure and firm value. Our study gives rise to the following findings. First, ownership concentration and insider ownership levels are determined by several institutional features such as investor protection, development of capital markets, activity of the market for corporate control, and effectiveness of boards. Second, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm value is not directly affected by these institutional factors. Third, there is, however, a direct influence of corporate governance characteristics on the relationship between insider ownership and firm value.
Insider Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: A Productivity Perspective Study in Taiwan’s Electronics Industry [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Her-Jiun Sheu, Chi-Yih Yang Corporate Governance. 2005. Vol. 13. No. 2. P. 326–337.
In the context of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360), how insider stock ownership relates to firm performance is explored in this paper. The relevant performance measure used is total factor productivity. Insiders are classified into executives, board members and blockholders so as to facilitate a detailed study. Five-year (1996–2000) panel data of 333 Taiwanese listed electronics firms are examined. It is observed that total insider ownership remains steady while the executive-to-insider holding ratio increases significantly. In terms of the effect on total factor productivity, neither the total insider ownership nor the board-to-insider holding ratio shows any influence on productivity. However, productivity first decreases then increases with the executive-to-insider holding ratio, forming a U-shaped relationship. The results indicate that stock ownership of top officers in high-tech firms should be encouraged to enhance productivity.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Darin G. Clay Working Papers (University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business). 2002.
Institutional shareholdings have a systematically positive effect on firm value and alter the Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) finding of a nonmonotonic relation between insider ownership and value. The evidence indicates that, on average, a 1% increase in institutional stock ownership translates to a 0.6% increase in the firm’s market-to-book ratio, or an increase of $125M for the mean firm in cross-sectional analysis. Controlling for institutional holdings converts the original MSV finding — that firm value first increases with stock ownership by the board, then decreases, and then increases again—to one in which firm value uniformly increases with greater board ownership. These findings support the view that increased incentives for monitoring both by the board and by institutional investors consistently leads to higher company value. The evidence also indicates that the positive relation between institutional holdings and firm value is stronger in firms with higher discretionary cash flows and in the period following the 1992 adoption of proxy rule amendments that increased the bargaining power of institutions.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Helen Short, Kevin Keasey Journal of Corporate Finance. 1999. Vol. 5. No. 1. P. 79-101.
Given the governance issues arising from the separation of ownership from control, the ability to align managerial and shareholder interests via the managerial ownership of equity is an important topic of inquiry. The findings of the primarily US based literature suggest that management is aligned at low and possibly high levels of ownership but is entrenched (pursuing self interests) at intermediate ownership levels. This paper extends the US based literature in a number of important ways. First, the analysis is extended to the UK where there are important differences, as compared to the US, in the governance system. A comparative analysis of key differences between the US and UK governance systems suggest that management should become entrenched at higher levels of ownership in the UK. Some of the reasons for this suggestion are that in the UK management do not have the same freedom as their US counterparts to mount takeover defenses and institutional investors in the UK are more able to co-ordinate their monitoring activities. The empirical results of the paper confirm that UK management become entrenched at higher levels of ownership than their US counterparts. Second, the results from extending the analysis to consider different measures of firm performance and a more generalized form of the relationship confirm the general finding of the US literature of a non-linear relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Kenneth A. Kim, Pattanaporn Kitsabunnarat, John R. Nofsinger Journal of Corporate Finance. 2004. Vol. 10. No. 3. P. 355-381.
We examine the operating performance of Thai firms after they go public. Overall, we find that their performance declines. We then explore the relationship between managerial ownership and the change in firm performance. We find that firms with ‘low’ and ‘high’ levels of managerial ownership experience positive relationships between managerial ownership and the change in performance (alignment-of-interest hypothesis), while firms with ‘intermediate’ levels of managerial ownership exhibit a negative relationship between managerial ownership and the change in performance (entrenchment hypothesis). Examining the operating performance of IPO firms from an emerging market and finding a curvilinear relationship between managerial ownership and the post-IPO change in performance represents two significant contributions to the IPO literature.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Harold Demsetz, Belen Villalonga Journal of Corporate Finance. 2001. Vol. 7. No. 3. P. 209-233.
This paper investigates the relation between the ownership structure and the performance of corporations if ownership is made multi-dimensional and also is treated as an endogenous variable. To our knowledge, no prior study has treated the corporate control problem this way. We find no statistically significant relation between ownership structure and firm performance. This finding is consistent with the view that diffuse ownership, while it may exacerbate some agency problems, also yields compensating advantages that generally offset such problems. Consequently, for data that reflect market-mediated ownership structures, no systematic relation between ownership structure and firm performance is to be expected.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Huimin Cui, Y.T. Mak Journal of Corporate Finance. 2002. Vol. 8. No. 4. P. 313-336.
Several studies have examined the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance/value (e.g., [Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1988) 293; Journal of Financial Economics 27 (1990) 595; Journal of Corporate Finance 5 (1999) 79]). Using different samples, these studies provide general support for the argument that increases in managerial ownership create countervailing interest alignment and entrenchment effects, leading to a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. However, the actual form of this nonlinear relationship differs across the studies. The present paper examines the relationship between managerial ownership and performance for high R&D firms that are listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. We find that Tobin’s Q initially declines with managerial ownership, then increases, then declines again and, finally, increases again—a W-shaped relationship. The findings from our study point to the importance of industry effects in the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Tatiana Nenova Journal of Financial Economics. 2003. Vol. 68. No. 3. P. 325-351.
This paper measures the value of corporate voting rights, specifically of the control block of votes, in a sample of 661 dual-class firms in 18 countries, in 1997. A consistent measure across countries is proposed. The measure is adjusted for takeover probability, block-holding costs, and dividend and liquidity differences between the share classes. The value of controlblock votes varies widely across countries. It is close to half of firm market value in South Korea, and close to zero in Finland. The value of control-block votes is interpreted as a lower bound for actual private benefits of the controlling shareholder. The legal environment, law enforcement, investor protection, takeover regulations, andpower-concentrating corporate charter provisions explain 68% of the cross-country variation in the value of control-block votes.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Gerard Charreaux, Phillippe Desbrières Journal of Management and Governance. 2004. Vol. 5. No. 2. P. 107-128.
Unsatisfied with the dominating shareholders’ point of view, that appears to be too limited to build a relevant theory of corporate governance, we propose an enlarged definition of the value which may be called, the stakeholder value. This definition and its associated measure are more suitable for the stakeholder approach to the firm and more relevant to understand the value creation and sharing mechanisms.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Stanley Root Металлы Евразии. 2004. № 6.
Тема корпоративной социальной ответственности (КСО) не является абсолютно новой для российского бизнеса: крупные градообразующие предприятия, различные ведомства еще в советское время поддерживали социальную сферу и соответствующую инфраструктуру. Трудящиеся получали путевки в дома отдыха, пользовались поликлиниками при предприятиях, имели продолжительные оплачиваемые отпуска. Однако такая деятельность предприятий не рассматривалась их руководителями как часть общей бизнес-стратегии, направленной в конечном итоге на обеспечение устойчивости и повышения стоимости предприятия. Сегодня Россия активно интегрируется в мировое сообщество, и определение, а также понимание корпоративной социальной ответственности постепенно сближается с мировыми стандартами.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Elizabeth A. Gordon, Elaine Henry, Darius Palia EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Papers. 2006. No. 4377.
Recent corporate scandals have raised considerable concern among regulators and stock market participants about related party transactions (RPTs), prompting Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) to prohibit personal loans to executives and non-executive board members. In a representative sample of companies for a period that predates SOX, we find RPTs are wide spread and involve equally executives and non-executive board members; additionally, the proportion of related party loans is smaller than other non-loan related party transactions such as purchases or direct services. When we examine the relationship between RPTs and the extant literature's corporate governance mechanisms (such as board characteristics, CEO pay-performance sensitivity, and outside monitors), we generally find weaker corporate governance mechanisms associated with more and higher dollar amounts of RPTs. We also find that industry-adjusted returns are negatively associated with RPTs. On further examination of loans versus other types of RPTs not considered in SOX, we find a negative relationship between industry-adjusted returns and the number and dollar amount of loans to executives and non-executive directors, and a similar relationship between the number of other types of RPTs with non-executive directors. In summary, our results provide support for the view of RPTs as conflicts of interest between managers/board members and their shareholders, in contrast with the view of RPTs as efficient transactions.
The Impact of Public Opinion on Board Structure Changes, Director Career Progression, and CEO Turnover: Evidence from CalPERS’ Corporate Governance Program [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007YiLin Wu Journal of Corporate Finance. 2004. Vol. 10. No. 1. P. 199-227.
Extant research investigates the effects of legal mechanisms and shareholder activism on corporate governance. Zingales [Journal of Finance 55 (2000) 1623] calls for research concerning the effects of public opinion on corporate governance. The California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) influences public opinion by publicly naming the companies having poor corporate governance. This study hypothesizes that public naming by CalPERS damages the reputations of management and directors at these companies, and these companies respond by improving their corporate governance. This hypothesis is supported by three findings. First, companies are more likely to decrease the number of inside directors after being named publicly by CalPERS. A large proportion of departing inside directors remains full-time employees in the named companies. Second, departing inside directors are less likely to take up future directorships after their companies are named publicly by CalPERS. Finally, the likelihood of CEO dismissal increases and the relation between performance and CEO dismissal becomes stronger after companies are named publicly by CalPERS. These three findings are consistent with the hypothesis that CalPERS influences public opinion and that reputation concerns are effective in compelling companies to improve their corporate governance system.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007David Manry, David Stangeland Journal of Corporate Finance. 2003. Vol. 9. No. 3. P. 353-375.
From 1989 through 1993, the United Shareholders Association (USA) published its Shareholder 1000 report, which ranked 1000 firms on several dimensions of corporate performance, including shareholder rights and management compensation. We examine two measures reported by the USA of the alignment between managers’ and shareholders’ interests: a shareholder rights score and a management compensation rating. The associations between these measures and measures of operating performance and investment levels are analyzed. We find evidence that the USA shareholder rights and management compensation scores are significantly and positively associated with measures of operating performance and investment spending. Further tests indicate that USA management compensation scores proxy for aspects of corporate behavior that have significant valuation implications not reflected in financial statements.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Christos Pitelis Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2004. Vol. 12. No. 2. P. 210-223.
We discuss the nature and role of (corporate) governance and (shareholder) value and their implications for (sustainable) economic performance. We critique and build on extant theory to develop a model of the determinants of value-wealth creation at the firm, national and global levels and explore current economic debates on governance and sustainable economic performance in its context. We conclude that (the need for) stakeholder value is derivative from (not opposed to) the concept of sustainable value, that national governance and the nationwide “governance-mix” impact on corporate governance and that national and global economic governance are essential for sustainable global value-wealth creation, and economic performance.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Rienk Goodijk Corporate Ownership & Control. 2003. Vol. 1. No. 1. P. 149-155.
In the highly competitive environment management builds relationships with very different kinds of stakeholders, acting more transparently, providing opportunities for dialogue and involvement and being accountable to all the stakeholders. The paper considers implementation of one of the most challenging instrument to build those relationships named "stakeholdermanagement". Improvements on corporate governance and stakeholder-management already have been found: in the further professionalising of the Supervisory Board by updating the board-profile, setting up audit- and remuneration-committees, introducing self-assessment (internal board-evaluations) etcetera; more openness and transparency in the annual reports, making mention of board members’ remuneration; increasing the influence of shareholders by providing opportunities to certificate-holders for more actively participating and voting at the General Meeting, and intensifying the relationships with investors; developing international employee participation, based on the European Directive on information and consultation and the implementation in Dutch law; intensifying customer relationships by developing a Customer Relationship Management system world-wide, using internet-opportunities (ING Direct), converting call centres to Customer Contact Centres, introducing customer-panels, etcetera; introducing HR-plans on inspiring leadership, performance management and diversity worldwide.
Do Corporate Control and Product Market Competition Lead to Stronger Productivity Growth? Evidence from Market-Oriented and Blockholderbased Governance Regimes [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Jens Koke, Luc Renneboog ECGI - Finance Working Paper. 2003. No. 14/2003.
This study investigates the impact of corporate governance and product market competition on total factor productivity growth for two large samples of German and UK firms. In poorly performing UK firms, the presence of strong outside blockholders lead to substantial increases in productivity. Contrarily, for German poorly performing and distressed firms, it is bank debt concentration which stimulates productivity growth. Whereas high bank debt concentration also supports productivity growth in German profitable firms, leverage is unrelated to productivity growth in UK firms. Weak product market competition in the UK has a negative impact on productivity growth of in both widely-held firms and concentrated firms with the exception of firms controlled insiders (directors). These seem able to generate productivity increases in firms subject to little market discipline. For profitable German firms, the relation between strong blockholder control and productivity growth is limited. Only control by banks, insurance firms and the government can somewhat reduce the negative effect of weak product market competition.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Marion Hutchinsona, Ferdinand A. Gul Journal of Corporate Finance. 2004. Vol. 10. No. 4. P. 595-614.
Prior research on the relationship between corporate controls and firm performance is premised on the notion that, in theory, there is direct association between corporate governance and firm performance. However, extensive research has produced mixed and often weak results. In this paper, we posit, as a primary relationship, a negative association between growth and firm performance and then examine whether corporate governance variables moderate this negative relationship. Our results support this notion and show that the role of corporate governance variables in firm performance should be evaluated in the context of the firm’s external environment measured in this study in terms of growth opportunities.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang, Woochan Kim Journal of Corporate Finance. 2006. Vol. 12. No. 3. P. 660-691.
This paper contributes to a new literature on the factors that affect firms’ corporate governance practices. We find that regulatory factors are highly important, largely because Korean rules impose special governance requirements on large fi rms (assets > 2 trillion won). Industry factors, firm size, and firm risk are also important. Other firm-specifi c factorsonly modestly affect governance even when they are statistically signifi cant. This suggests that many Korean fi rms do not choose their governance to maximize share price. Among firm specific factors, the most significant are size (larger firms are better governed) and firm risk (riskier firms are better governed). Long-term averages of profitability and equity finance need are significant, where short-term averages are not. This is consistent with “sticky governance,”in which firms after their governance slowly in response to economic factors.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Arturo Capasso SSRN Working Papers. 2006.
Since the beginning of the 21st century, a few serious financial scandals and many cases of corporate mismanagement have driven scholars and politicians to devote increasing attention to corporate governance, in a close relation with business ethics issues. In academic literature, as well as in public policy debates, corporate governance is nowadays acknowledged as a critical factor in economic development and financial markets stability. The evolution in the nature of the firm is among the major causes for the crisis of established corporate governance models. The traditional manufacturing companies - vertically integrated and capital intensive - which emerged at the beginning of the last century and had since then prevailed - have been challenged by new organizational structures, based on intangible assets and networks, more appropriate to a dynamically changing environment, where competition is driven by the availability of distinctive competencies, based on firm-specific knowledge. This paper, building on the resource based view of the firm, but also on stakeholder approach to strategic management, explores how the growing importance of intangible assets is reshaping, in many industries, the basic conditions of corporate governance. The aim is twofold: i) to explain logically why intangible assets modifies the allocation of residual claims, as company performance can substantially affect the wealth of other stakeholders ii) to determine which constituencies should be considered as relevant stakeholders and contribute, to some extent, to the corporate governance.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Ronald C. Lease, John J. McConnell, Wayne H. Mikkelson Journal of Financial Economics. 1983. Vol. 11. No. 1-4. P. 439-471.
This paper tests the hypothesis that the future distribution of payoffs provided by a common stock depends upon whether ownership of the stock also conveys control over the firm's activities. For 26 firms that had two classes of common stock outstanding, the class with superior voting rights traded at a premium relative to the other class. However, in four firms where the ownership structure of the firm also included a class of voting preferred stock, the class of common with superior voting rights traded at a significant discount relative to the class of common with inferior voting rights. The analysis suggests that there are both benefits and costs of corporate control.