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Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 596

Опубликовано на портале: 25-11-2008
Franklin Allen, Mengxin Zhao PKU Business Review. 2007.  Vol. 36. No. 7. P. 98-102. 
In the U.S. and U.K. corporate governance is concerned with the narrow goal of ensuring that firms maximize the wealth of shareholders. In Japan and some other countries, firms are concerned with a broader group of stakeholders, including employees, suppliers, customers and others as well as shareholders. This article contrasts the Anglo-American system of corporate governance with that in Japan and elsewhere. If markets and institutions are well developed and competitive, Anglo-American corporate governance ensures an efficient allocation of resources. In other circumstances, focusing on a wider range of stakeholders as the Japanese do can be more efficient.
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Опубликовано на портале: 25-11-2008
Igor Filatotchev, David E. Guest, Jenifer Piesse, Gregory Jackson, Howard Gospel DTI Economics Working Paper. 2005.  No. 13.
This collection of short papers examines the role of corporate governance with regard to human resource management and corporate strategy over the course of the firm life cycle, as well as in diverse institutional environments such as the UK, Germany and Japan.
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Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Gregory Jackson European Management Review. 2008.  Vol. 5. No. 1. P. 23-26. 
The article 'A New Finance Capitalism?' raises an important paradox. Institutional investors are growing in size and the concentration of their stakes gives them potential influence over managers. Yet we observe an unexpected absence of shareholder activism and voice on the part of institutional investors in contemporary America. Concentration occurs without commitment. This comment further explores some reasons why today's largest investors seem resigned to or even to benefit from their relative passivity and preference of exit over voice. These reasons include conflicts of interest, market failures, lack of organizational capabilities, use of informal voice, and dependence of markets for corporate control. Corporate governance scholars have surprisingly little evidence on these topics, which suggest an important agenda for future research.
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Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Ruth Aguilera, Gregory Jackson Academy Of Management Review. 2003.  Vol. 28. No. 3. P. 447-465. 
We develop a theoretical model to describe and explain variation in corporate governance among advanced capitalist economies, identifying the social relations and institutional arrangements that shape who controls corporations. what interests corporations serve. and the allocation of rights and responsibilities among corporate stakeholders. Our "actor-centered" institutional approach explains firm-level corporate governance practices in terms of institutional factors that shape how actors' interests are defined ("socially constructed") and represented. Our model has strong implications for studying issues of international convergence.
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Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Gregory Jackson Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005.  Vol. 13. No. 3. P. 419-428. 
A small but significant stream of research has emerged on how changes in corporate governance impact labour management, particularly in countries with stakeholder-oriented corporate governance. This paper briefly reviews existing empirical and theoretical literature on the links between corporate governance and labour management. Then it compares recent trends in Germany and Japan in terms of how changes in corporate governance affect the distribution of value-added, employment adjustment, pay systems and employee participation. Germany and Japan have proven able to adapt and modify their stakeholder model of employment and employee participation to changing circumstances. However, the size of the core model is getting smaller.
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Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Gregory Jackson, A. Moerke Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2008.  Vol. 13. No. 3. P. 2005. 
Germany and Japan are often seen deviating from an economic model of shareholder control and thereby as being similar by virtue of their mutual contrast with the US. Given the common challenges for bank-based and stakeholder-oriented models of corporate governance, Germany–Japan comparison seems particularly timely. This article provides an introductory overview and analysis for the Special Issue by comparing recent developments in corporate law reform, banking and finance, and employment in Germany and Japan. While rejecting arguments for international convergence, we discuss this evidence of simultaneous continuity and change in corporate governance as a potential form of hybridisation of national models or renegotiation of stakeholder coalitions in German and Japanese firms. One consequence is the growing diversity of firm-level corporate governance practices within national systems.
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Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Masahiko Aoki, Gregory Jackson Industrial and Corporate Change. 2008.  Vol. 17. No. 1. P. 1-27. 
This article proposes a simple framework for understanding an emergent diversity of linkages between corporate governance (CG) and organizational architecture (OA). It distinguishes discreet modes of their linkage by different combinatorial patterns between three basic assets: managers human assets (MHA), workers human assets (WHA), and non-human assets (NHA). Using the concept of essentiality of human assets proposed by Hart (1995) and distinguished from that of complementarities, we first propose a new characterization of four known modes of CG-OA linkage: three traditional (Anglo-American, German, and Japanese) and one relatively new (Silicon Valley) models. Then we present empirical evidences of emergent diversity of CG-OA linkages in Japan, which is somewhat at odds with the old Japanese model. We interpret its emergent dominant mode as the path-dependent evolution of a new pattern of essentiality between human assets, made viable by lessening of institutional-complementarity-constraints, which surrounded the traditional Japanese model. We argue that this new mode interpreted in terms of essentiality may have broader applicability beyond Japanese context.
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Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Ruth Aguilera, Gregory Jackson, Igor Filatotchev, Howard Gospel Organization Science. 2008.  Vol. 19. No. 3. P. 475-492 . 
This paper develops an organizational approach to corporate governance and assesses the effectiveness of corporate governance and implications for policy. Most corporate governance research focuses on a universal link between corporate governance practices (e. g., board structure, shareholder activism) and performance outcomes, but neglects how interdependencies between the organization and diverse environments lead to variations in the effectiveness of different governance practices. In contrast to such closed systems approaches, we propose a framework based on open systems approaches to organizations, which examines these organizational interdependencies in terms of the costs, contingencies, and complementarities of different corporate governance practices. These three sets of organizational factors are useful in analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance in diverse organizational environments. We also explore the impact of costs, contingencies, and complementarities on the effectiveness of different governance aspects through the use of stylized cases and discuss the implications for different approaches to policy such as soft law or hard law.
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Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Gregory Jackson
Ред.: Masahiko Aoki, Hideaki Miyajima
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 0199284512, 416 с.
This book uses comparative institutional analysis to explain differences in national economic performance. Countries have their own rules for corporate governance and they have different market arrangements; and these differences in rules and organization affect the way firms behave. Countries also tend to develop conventions of organizational architechture of firms, whether their hierarchies are functional, horizontal, or decentralized. This affects the way in which they process information, and information management is increasingly seen as being of crucial importance to a firm's performance. Aoki accords more importance to these factors than to the factors conventionally used in applying a neoclassical model of economic efficiency. He applies game theory, contract theory, and information theory. By describing the rules and norms in Japan, the USA, and the transitional economies, Aoki shows how firms can achieve competitive advantage in international markets if these conventions and rules are well suited to the industrial sector in which the firms operate. He is particularly concerned with how Japan, with its main bank and lifelong employment systems, as well as information-sharing firm organizational structure, might reform its institutions to maintain competitive advantage in the world economy.
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Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Ред.: Gregory Jackson, Roger Strange
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, 2008, 336 с.
Corporate governance has not, until recently, been a major topic for international business scholars. Corporate Governance and International Business, however, brings together a number of leading scholars and pioneering pieces of research in order to demonstrate that corporate governance and international business are clearly linked. By solving principle-agent problems and fostering different forms of stakeholder investment, it illustrates how corporate governance influences the attractiveness of host countries to inward investors, as well as the internationalization strategies of multinational enterprises themselves. Drawing on a number of different disciplinary approaches and methodological styles, the papers in this book also explore how international investors and the activities of multinational enterprises influence the institutional diversity of corporate governance around the world through novel patterns of diffusion and adaptation.
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Опубликовано на портале: 11-11-2008
Ред.: Alberto Chong, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes
Washington: World Bank Publications, 2007, cерия "Latin American Development Forum", 557 с.
Investor Protection and Corporate Governance analyzes the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and valuation. Using unique datasets gathered at the firm-level - the first such data in the region - and results from a homogeneous corporate governance questionnaire, the book examines corporate governance characteristics, ownership structures, dividend policies, and performance measures. The book's analysis reveals the very high levels of ownership and voting rights concentrations and monolithic governance structures in the largest samples of Latin American companies up to now, and new data emphasize the importance of specific characteristics of the investor protection regimes in several Latin American countries. By and large, those firms with better governance measures across several dimensions are granted higher valuations and thus lower cost of capital. This title will be useful to researchers, policy makers, government officials, and other professionals involved in corporate governance, economic policy, and business finance, law, and management.
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Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Financial Economics. 2008.  Vol. 88. No. 3. P. 430-465.. 
We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, that govern a specific self-dealing transaction. This theoretically grounded index predicts a variety of stock market outcomes, and generally works better than the previously introduced index of anti-director rights.
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Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 2002.  Vol. 57. No. 3. P. 1147-1170. 
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder.
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Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Financial Economics. 2000.  Vol. 58. No. 1-2. P. 3-27. 
Recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and in the access of firms to external finance. A common element to the explanations of these differences is how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries, discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems.
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Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Jonathan Charkham
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 460 с.
How should companies be organized? To whom should boards of directors be responsible--shareholders, or a wider group of stakeholders? In this fiercely competitive world we cannot judge our own system of corporate governance in isolation; it must bear comparison with the best. The second edition of this acclaimed and well-established book aims to do just that. Since publication of the first edition interest in corporate governance has greatly increased, codes have proliferated, and principles laid down nationally and internationally. In Keeping Good Company, the author describes developments in the system of corporate governance-both the business environment and the particular structures of company organization-in five major industrial countries: Germany, Japan, France, the USA and the UK. This second edition is fully revised, updated and expanded, and includes a new conclusion looking at a number of ongoing issues in corporate governance, and an appendix discussing the role of international organizations.
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Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Franklin Allen Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 2005.  Vol. 21. No. 2. P. 164-177 . 
Most of the literature on corporate governance emphasizes that firms should be run in the interests of shareholders. This is an appropriate objective function when markets are perfect and complete. In many emerging economies this is not the case: markets are imperfect and incomplete. The first theme of the paper is that alternative firm objective functions, such as pursuing the interests of all stakeholders, may help overcome market failures. The second theme is that it is not necessarily optimal to use the law to ensure good corporate governance. Other mechanisms such as competition, trust, and reputation may be preferable.
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Опубликовано на портале: 23-12-2007
Gianni De Nicolo, Luc Laeven, Kenichi Ueda IMF, Working Paper. 2006.  No. 06/293.
This paper constructs a composite index of corporate governance quality, documents its evolution from 1994 through 2003 in selected emerging and developed economies, and assesses its impact on aggregate and corporate growth and productivity. Our investigation yields three main findings. First, corporate governance quality in most countries has overall improved, although to varying degrees and with a few notable exceptions. Second, the data exhibit cross-country convergence in corporate governance quality with countries that score poorly initially catching up with countries with high corporate governance scores. Third, the impact of improvements in corporate governance quality on traditional measures of real economic activity—GDP growth, productivity growth, and the ratio of investment to GDP— is positive, significant, and quantitatively relevant, and the growth effect is particularly pronounced for industries that are most dependent on external finance.
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Опубликовано на портале: 20-12-2007
Ronald Philip Dore CentrePiece Magazine. 2006.  Vol. 11. No. 3. P. 22-24. 
Over the past decade or so, there has been a fundamental change in what the managers of Japanese companies believe are their key objectives. Ronald Dore traces the country’s conversion to Anglo-Saxon capitalism - and growing concerns about the emergence of a new 'divided society'.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-12-2007
Алла Николаевна Стерлигова Вестник унивеситета (Государственный университет управления). 2006.  Т. 17. № 4. С. 183-194. 
В статье представлены результаты проведенного по отечественным и зарубежным материалам исследования. Приведен обзор состояния менеджмента, предложены критерии классификации видов менеджмента в рамках интегрирующей и диф-ференцирующей тенденций развития управления организацией, выявлены направле-ния интеграции современного менеджмента.
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