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Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 36

Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
K. Ho Applied Economics Letters. 2003.  Vol. 10. No. 1. P. 15-20. 
Traditional studies of long-run stock price abnormal performance after corporate events compare the mean returns of an event firm portfolio and a benchmark firm portfolio or index. However, it is well known that long-run abnormal returns are non-normal leading to problems with statistical inference on abnormal performance. Instead in this paper, the entire return distributions of event firms and the benchmark index using non-parametric tests of stochastic dominance are compared. Tests are applied for first and second order stochastic dominance to Ritter's (1991) IPO data. It is found, contrary to results that compare only mean returns, that IPO firms do not underperform a benchmark index. The results are robust to extreme values of buy-and-hold return of IPO firms and underline the fact that long-run abnormal performance measurement is sensitive to the methodology used.

Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Bruce Burton, Christine Helliar, David Power Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2004.  Vol. 12. No. 3. P. 353-360. 
Corporate governance as a coherent notion and independent topic of academic and practitioner interest has developed rapidly in the last ten years. In particular, most countries have seen the publication of vast numbers of regulatory reports outlining best practice in handling the issues that arise from the increased prominence of the governance concept. Although a vast literature exists on the implications of an Initial Public Offering (IPO) for financial performance and ownership structure, few investigations have communicated directly with issuing firms and analysed the practical difficulties encountered on a day-to-day basis when a company decides to float. In particular, very few studies have sought to examine what corporate governance changes, if any, are made in the process. This note reports the findings of a questionnaire survey and a series of interviews with practitioners about the changes that are made before and after a sample of IPOs in the UK.

Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Steen Thomsen, Torben Pedersen Strategic management journal. 2000.  Vol. 21. No. 6. P. 689-696. 
The paper examines the impact of ownership structure on company economic performance in 435 of the largest European companies. Controlling for industry, capital structure and nation effects we find a positive effect of ownership concentration on shareholder value (market -to- book value of equity) and profitability (asset returns), but the effect levels off for high ownership shares. Furthermore we propose and support the hypothesis that the identity of large owners—family, bank, institutional investor, government, and other companies—has important implications for corporate strategy and performance. For example, compared to other owner identities, financial investor ownership is found to be associated with higher shareholder value and profitability, but lower sales growth. The effect of ownership concentration is also found to depend on owner identity.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Steen Thomsen, Torben Pedersen, Hans Kurt Kvist Journal of Corporate Finance. 2006.  Vol. 12. No. 2. P. 246-269. 
In this study, Granger tests are used to examine the relationship between blockholder ownership and the values of the largest companies in the European Union and the US. Previous studies on US data have found that blockholder ownership has no systematic effect on performance. We propose that these results may not apply to Continental Europe, where ownership concentration is typically higher, the level of investor protection is lower, and influential blockholders may have objectives other than shareholder value. In accordance with previous research, we find no significant association between blockholder ownership and prior or subsequent firm value in either the US or the UK. Nonetheless, in Continental Europe we find a negative association between blockholder ownership and firm value or accounting returns in the next period. Further analysis reveals that this association is significant only for companies with high initial levels of blockholder ownership (>10%). We interpret this finding as evidence of conflicts of interest between blockholders and minority investors. The percentage of blockholder ownership in Continental Europe may be too high from a minority shareholder value viewpoint.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Mike Burkart, Fausto Panunzi Journal of Financial Intermediation. 2006.  Vol. 15. No. 1. P. 1-31. 
This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, monitoring, and ownership concentration. Legal protection affects the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because monitoring weakens managerial incentives, both effects jointly determine the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration. When legal protection facilitates monitoring better laws strengthen the monitoring incentives, and ownership concentration and legal protection are inversely related. By contrast, when legal protection and monitoring are substitutes better laws weaken the monitoring incentives, and the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration is non-monotone. This holds irrespective of whether or not the large shareholder can reap private benefits. Moreover, better legal protection may exacerbate rather than alleviate the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Hans Degryse, Abe de Jong International Journal of Industrial Organization. 2006.  Vol. 24. No. 1. P. 125-147. 
This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, monitoring, and ownership concentration. Legal protection affects the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because monitoring weakens managerial incentives, both effects jointly determine the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration. When legal protection facilitates monitoring better laws strengthen the monitoring incentives, and ownership concentration and legal protection are inversely related. By contrast, when legal protection and monitoring are substitutes better laws weaken the monitoring incentives, and the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration is non-monotone. This holds irrespective of whether or not the large shareholder can reap private benefits. Moreover, better legal protection may exacerbate rather than alleviate the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Yoser Gadhoum, Marie-Helene Noiseux, Daniel Zeghal Investment Management & Financial Innovations. 2005.  Vol. 2. No. 4. P. 50-68. 
Evidence supporting the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance has been rather contradictory. In this research, we investigate the effects of ownership structure on business performance on a sample of 600 listed Canadian firms. We used a three-phase analysis of variance in which each phase used a different definition of ownership concentration: i) the overall concentration of the five largest shareholders (CONC); ii) the holdings of the largest shareholder (BLC1); and iii) inside shareholders as either managers or directors (BLCI). For each phase, we used cluster analysis and three other concentration cutoff levels (an even-split into thirds, extreme quartiles, and the Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) cutoff) to verify if there is an optimal level of concentration cutoff that may impact the performance. Our results indicate a high level of ownership concentration in Canadian corporations. The Berle-Means widely held corporation is far from universal. Besides, while state control of traded firms is infrequent, family control is common. However, our findings indicate only a weak association between performance measures and ownership concentration levels, except for the return on investment, which shows some improvement with a high level of ownership. Our results confirm those of Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Overall, no evidence is found to support the efficient monitoring hypothesis, since performance cannot be improved by blockholders who seem not only to be entrenched but may benefit from perquisites and on-the-job consumption. This might indicate that large shareholders expropriate minority absentee owners.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Maretno Harjoto, John Garen Journal of Corporate Finance. 2005.  Vol. 11. No. 4. P. 661-679. 
This study examines the firm's equity ownership by insiders and blockholders starting right after the firm goes public, its decline thereafter, and what alters the decline. Previous literature has shown the incentive of insiders to let their ownership fall after their initial public offering (IPO). After the IPO, management attains only a fraction of the benefits of good governance, so has an incentive to let inside ownership erode. We verify this, but examine the effect that re-entry into capital market via a seasoned equity offering (SEO) has on insider ownership. The incentive of management to hold stock is restored by a desire to raise additional capital because it implicitly raises management's stake. We show empirically that it raises insider stockholding relative to what it otherwise would have been, thus providing an avenue by which this aspect of corporate governance is improved. This, and other results, is shown with a sample of IPO firms during 1996 and 1997. Our findings indicate that, in expectation, the increased holdings due to re-entry into the capital market almost exactly offsets 1 year's downward trend in management shareholdings. Also, we find an interesting interplay between types of blockholders in that CEOs tend to hold less stock after the IPO if external blockholders initially hold more.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Raihan Khan, Ravi Dharwadkar, Pamela Brandes Journal of Business Research. 2005.  Vol. 58. No. 8. P. 1078-1088. 
Limited research has looked at how the aspects of institutional ownership affect executive compensation. Using an agency theory approach, we investigate how institutional ownership concentration and dispersion affect levels of CEO compensation, pay mix, and stock option pay sensitivity. We find that the largest owner's concentration is associated with lower levels of compensation, as well as with higher ratios of salary to total compensation and lower ratios of options to total compensation, but that the number of blockholders does not predict any aspects of CEO compensation. In addition, institutional ownership dispersion is associated with increased levels of compensation and greater use of incentive compensation. Finally, higher levels of CEO ownership lead to a significant reduction in the level of options compensation, as well as higher ratios of salary to total compensation and lower ratios of options to total compensation.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Mark G. Brown Euromoney. 2005.  Vol. 36. No. 433. P. 29-29. 
This article focuses on the leveraged buyout (LBO) market in Europe. Two contrasting European leveraged buyouts have shown how the leveraged finance market is developing in 2005. While ideas like Cablecom's refinancing and Greece's first ever LBO are being funded largely in the bond markets, the secondary buyout of German motorway service station chain Tank & Rast backed the trend and used senior debt. Allianz Capital Partners, Lufthansa and funds advised by Apax Partners agreed to sell their shares in Tank & Rast to British private-equity house Terra Firma Capital Partners in November 2004. Terra had been looking at the acquisition for more than a year. Meanwhile,JP Morgan and Deutsche Bank are acting as arrangers and bookrunners on the LBO of 80.87% in Telecom Italia's Greek mobile operator Tim Hellas Communications.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Benjamin Maury, Anete Pajuste Journal of Banking & Finance. 2005.  Vol. 29. No. 7. P. 1813-1834. 
This paper investigates the effects of having multiple large shareholders on the valuation of firms. Using data on Finnish listed firms, we show, consistent with our model, that a more equal distribution of votes among large blockholders has a positive effect on firm value. This result is particularly strong in family-controlled firms suggesting that families (which typically have managerial or board representation) are more prone to private benefit extraction if they are not monitored by another strong blockholder. We also show that the relation between multiple blockholders and firm value is significantly affected by the identity of these blockholders.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Bruce Seifert, Halit Gonenc, Jim Wright Journal of Multinational Financial Management. 2005.  Vol. 15. No. 2. P. 171-191. 
This paper examines the effects of equity ownership by insiders and equity ownership by blockholders and institutions on performance using samples of firms from four countries (United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan). While there are no consistent relationships between insider ownership or blockholder/institutional ownership on performance across the four countries, there are nevertheless significant associations between ownership of these groups and performance within the four countries. Our results may indicate that the effects of insider ownership and/or blockholders/institutions depend very much on local laws or the local business environment. In contrast, the effects of the control factors on performance are much more consistent. Leverage, for example, tends to have a negative effect while capital expenditures and sales growth both generally have a positive effect.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Maciej Dzierzanowski, Piotr Tamowicz Corporate Ownership & Control. 2004.  Vol. 1. No. 3. P. 20-30. 
With the company-level data on listed and unlisted companies we analyse ownership and control of Polish corporations. We find that voting control in listed corporations is remarkably concentrated with the median size of the largest block amounting to 39,5%. A sustainable concentration trend has been observed over the whole last decade. Other companies and individuals/families (mostly founders) dominate among the largest block-holders of Polish corporations. Banks' involvement in control is below common expectations. It is also observed that-especially in smaller firms-managerial ownership is quite large. Frequently, managers are also the company founders and first or second largest block-holder. The extent of ownership and control separation is very modest with dual-class shares being the most popular device to leverage control over ownership; control through subsidiaries is applied to a lesser extent. The presence of large blockholders in listed corporations puts the minority rights and conflict of interests among stakeholders on the top of the policy agenda. Our analysis shows that the Polish capital market may be in desperate need of improvement in this respect.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Phillippe Desbrières, Alain Schatt Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. 2002.  Vol. 29. No. 5/6. P. 695-730. 
This paper investigates the financial characteristics and changes in performance of French companies involved in a leveraged buyout. The empirical study covers a sample of 161 MBOs in France from 1988 to 1994. The acquired firms outperform their counterparts in the same sector of activity before and after the buyout. However, unlike findings concerning LBOs in the USA and the UK, the performance of French firms falls after the operation is completed. This downturn in performance seems to be less detrimental to former subsidiaries of groups than to former family businesses.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Francis Declerck Agribusiness. 1995.  Vol. 11. No. 6. P. 523-536. 
Focuses on the created value of leveraged buyouts (LBO) in the US Food Industries in the 1980s. Value of LBOs in the food industries in 1989; Analysis of objective of private firms in LBO; Analysis of debt and divestitures.
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РЦБ. Управление компанией [интернет ресурс]
Обновлено: 09-12-2010

Журнал издается с 1998 г., выходит два раза в месяц. Объем одного номера составляет 80 стр. Журнал предназначен для начинающих предпринимателей, публикует материалы о том, как увеличить стоимость компании, добиться ее роста и максимизации прибыли, стать лидером в своей области, разработать конкурентную стратегию, вести конструктивный диалог с акционерами и использовать их возможности.