A Simple Model of Educational Standards
Опубликовано на портале: 06-02-2007
American Economic Review.
1994.
Vol. 84.
No. 4.
P. 956-71.
Тематический раздел:
The author models standards for educational credentials, such as high-school diplomas.
Standard-setters maximize their conception of social welfare, knowing that utility-maximizing
students choose whether to meet the standard. The author shows that more egalitarian
policymakers set lower standards, the median voter would prefer higher standards
(under symmetric distributions), and decentralization lowers standards (among identical
communities). Optimal standards do not necessarily fall with increased student preference
for leisure, deterioration of nonstudent inputs to education, or increased student
heterogeneity. Superseding binary credentials by perfect information increases average
achievement and social welfare for plausible degrees of heterogeneity, egalitarianism,
and pooling under decentralization.
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