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Large Shareholders and Corporate Control

Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003
Journal of Political Economy. 1986.  Vol. 94. No. 3. P. 461-488. 
In a corporation with many small owners, it may not pay any one of them to monitor the performance of the management. We explore a model in which the presence of a large minority shareholder provides a partial solution to this free-rider problem. The model sheds light on the following questions: Under what circumstances will we observe a tender offer as opposed to a proxy fight or an internal management shake-up? How strong are the forces pushing toward increasing concentration of ownership of a diffusely held firm? Why do corporate and personal investors commonly hold stock in the same firm, despite their disparate tax preferences?

Статья используется в учебной программе Seminar in Corporate Finance, Howe J.S.

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