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Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions

Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007
RAND Journal of Economics. 2003.  Vol. 34. No. 2. P. 329-55. 
Internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce. We examine a unique dataset of eBay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior. We first document a number of empirical regularities. We then specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on eBay. Using our parameter estimates from this model, we measure the extent of the winner's curse and simulate seller revenue under different reserve prices.

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http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261(200322)34%3A2%3C329%3ATWCRPA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7
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