на главную поиск contacts

The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions

Опубликовано на портале: 24-01-2007
Journal of Political Economy. 1989.  Vol. 97. No. 5. P. 1060-1090. 
The authors show that the seller's problem in devising an optimal auction is virtually identical to the monopolist's problem in third-degree price discrimination. More generally, many of the important results and elegant techniques developed in the field of mechanism design can be reinterpreted in the language of standard microeconomic theory. They illustrate this by considering the problem of bilateral exchange with privately-known values.

текст статьи в формате pdf на сайте JSTOR:
Ключевые слова

См. также:
Lawrence R. Glosten, Ravi Jaganathan, David E. Runkle
Journal of Finance. 1993.  Vol. 48. No. 5. P. 1779-1801. 
Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, Jerry Richard Green
Geoffrey A. Jehle, Philip John Reny
Ariel Pakes, Richard E. Ericson
Review of Economic Studies. 1995.  Vol. 62. No. 1. P. 53-82.