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An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information

Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007
American Economic Review. 1988.  Vol. 78. No. 5. P. 865-883. 
This paper examines federal auctions for drain age leases on the Outer Continental Shelf from 1959 to 1969. These are leases that are adjacent to tracts on which a deposit has been discovered. The authors find that the data strongly support the hypotheses that neighbor firms are better informed about the value of a lease than nonneighbor firms; that neighbor firms coordinate their bidding decisions; and that both types of firms bid strategically in accordance with the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium model for first-price, sealed-bid auctions with asymmetric information.

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