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Why new issues are underpriced

Опубликовано на портале: 26-10-2004
Journal of Financial Economics. 1986.  Vol. 15. No. 1-2. P. 187-212. 
Тематический раздел:
This paper presents a model for the underpricing of initial public offerings. The argument depends upon the existence of a group of investors whose information is superior to that of the firm as well as that of all other investors. If the new shares are priced at their expected value, these priveleged investors crowd out the others when good issues are offered and they withdraw from the market when bad issues are offered. The offering firm must price the shares at a discount in order to guarantee that the uninformed investors purchase the issue.

Статья используется в учебной программе Seminar in Corporate Finance (Howe J.S.)

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