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On Financial Architecture: Leverage, Maturity, and Priority

Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance. 1996.  Vol. 8. No. 4. P. 4-17. 
In this paper we expand the scope of our earlier study, examining broader facets of corporate financial architecture. Here we focus specifically on the maturity and priority of the firm's debt by looking at 6000 firms during the period 1981-1993. As in our earlier study, we test three basic explanations of these corporate financing choices. In addition to the incentive-contracting argument described above, we also test "signaling" and "tax" explanations. Consistent with our findings, this study provides strong evidence for the incentive-contracting explanation, but only weak support for the signaling and tax arguments.

текст статьи в формате PDF доступен на сайте Майкла Барклая (Michael J. Barclay):
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NBER Working Paper Series. 2002.  w8939.