The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
Опубликовано на портале: 24-01-2007
Econometrica.
1997.
Vol. 65.
No. 2.
P. 375-384.
Тематические разделы:
This article describes an evolutionary approach to understanding Walrasian behavior.
It avoids any considerations related to the absence of monopoly power or related
notion of a large enough population. Walrasian behavior may evolve within any quantity-setting
oligopoly producing a homogenous good, provided that the law of demand is satisfied.
Evolutionary models may produce interesting behavior that does not correspond to
a Nash equilibrium.
Ключевые слова
См. также:
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Университетское управление.
1998.
№ 4(7).
С. 49-51.
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Экономическая наука современной России.
2002.
№ 2.
С. 173-176.
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