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The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior

Опубликовано на портале: 24-01-2007
Econometrica. 1997.  Vol. 65. No. 2. P. 375-384. 
This article describes an evolutionary approach to understanding Walrasian behavior. It avoids any considerations related to the absence of monopoly power or related notion of a large enough population. Walrasian behavior may evolve within any quantity-setting oligopoly producing a homogenous good, provided that the law of demand is satisfied. Evolutionary models may produce interesting behavior that does not correspond to a Nash equilibrium.

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текст статьи в формате pdf на сайте JSTOR:
http://www.jstor.org/view/00129682/di982593/98p01792/0
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