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Inequality, inflation, and central bank independence

Опубликовано на портале: 11-01-2003
Canadian Journal of Economics. 2000.  Vol. 33 . No. 1 . P. 271-287 . 
What can account for the different contemporaneous inflation experiences of various countries, and of the same country over time? We present an analysis of the determination of inflation from a political economy perspective. We document a positive correlation between income inequality and inflation and then present a theory of the determination of inflation outcomes in democratic societies that illustrates how greater inequality leads to greater inflation, owing to a desire by voters for wealth redistribution. We conclude by showing that democracies with more independent central banks tend to have better inflation outcomes for a given degree of inequality.

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См. также:
Guillermo A. Calvo, Carlos A. Vegh
Gregory N. Mankiw
Stanley Fisher, Ratna Sahay, Carlos A. Vegh
NBER Working Paper Series. 2002.  P. 8930. 
William F. Sharpe, Gordon J. Alexander, Jeffrey W. Bailey