на главную поиск contacts

Cyclic Games: An Introduction and Some Examples

Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2005
Games and Economic Behavior. 2001.  Vol. 34. No. 1. P. 138-152. 
Тематический раздел:
We introduce a model of a cyclic game. Designed to take advantage of the recurring nature of certain economic and social situations, a cyclic game differs from an extensive form game in that a cyclic game does not necessarily have an end. The same situations, although with different players, may be repeated infinitely often. We provide an example showing that, even though a cyclic game has, in a sense, perfect information, it may not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We demonstrate existence of equilibrium and illustrate the application of our model to an oligopolistic industry.

текст статьи в формате pdf:
Ключевые слова

См. также:
Мария Семеновна Круглова
Journal of Institutional Studies (Журнал институциональных исследований). 2018.  Т. 10. № 3. С. 49-57. 
Баграт Айкович Ерзнкян
Journal of Institutional Studies (Журнал институциональных исследований). 2017.  Т. 9. № 1. С. 27-38. 
Drew Fudenberg, Eric S. Maskin
Econometrica. 1986.  Vol. 54. No. 3. P. 533-554. 
Сергей Вениаминович Жак
TERRA ECONOMICUS. 2003.  Т. 1. № 3. С. 95-97.