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Библиографический список к теме «Взаимосвязь политики и экономики. Рентоориентированное поведение»

Опубликовано на портале: 11-08-2004
Библиографический список охватывает литературу связанную описывающую влияние политической сферы на экономику. Отражены, как классические работы, так и современные исследования по темам: политического делового цикла, электорального поведения и рациональности поведения, роли средств массовой информации в выборах, роли государства в экономике.

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