Эксоцман
на главную поиск contacts

Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives

Опубликовано на портале: 22-06-2006
Journal of Political Economy. 1990.  Vol. 98. No. 2. P. 225-264. 
Our estimates of the pay-performance relation (including pay, options, stockholdings, and dismissal) for chief executive officers indicate that CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. Although the incentives generated by stock ownership are large relative to pay and dismissal incentives, most CEOs hold trivial fractions of their firm's stock, and ownership levels have declined over the past 50 years. We hypothesize that public and private political forces impose constraints that reduce the pay-performance sensitivity. Declines in both the pay-performance relation and the level of CEO pay since the 1930s are consistent with this hypothesis.



Статья используется в учебной программе Seminar in Corporate Finance (Howe J.S.)

Ссылки
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28199004%2998%3A2%3C225%3APPATI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I
BiBTeX
RIS
Ключевые слова

См. также:
Robert Boyer
Research & Regulation Working Papers. 2005.  No. 2005-1.
[Статья]
Sigurt Vitols
Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005.  Vol. 13. No. 3. P. 386 - 396. 
[Статья]
Robert Boyer
PSE Working Papers. 2005.  No. 2005-39.
[Статья]
David Yermack
Journal of Financial Economics. 2003.  Vol. 40. No. 2. P. 185-211. 
[Статья]
Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, Alisa Roell
NBER Working Paper Series. 2002.  No. 9371.
[Статья]