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Corporate governance and shareholder initiatives: Empirical evidence

Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003
Journal of Financial Economics. 1996.  Vol. 42. No. 3. P. 365-395. 
Shareholder-initiated proxy proposals on corporate governance issues became popular in the late 1980s as corporate takeover activity declined. We find firms attracting governance proposals have poor prior performance, as measured by the market-to-book ratio, operating return, and sales growth. There is little evidence that operating returns improve after proposals. The proposals also have negligible effects on company share values and top management turnover. Even proposals that receive a majority of shareholder votes typically do not engender share price increases or discernible changes in firm policies.

Статья используется в учебной программе Seminar in Corporate Finance, Howe J.S.

текст статьи в формате pdf можно найти на cтранице сайта Elsevier Science, посвященной журналу Journal of Financial Economics: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VBX-3VV43JF-4&_user=10&_handle=W-WA-A-A-C-MsSAYVW-UUA-AUCABBYUYD-VWVBWYEWU-C-U&_fmt=summary&_coverDate=11%2F30%2F1996&_rdoc=4&_orig=browse&_srch=%23toc%235938%231996%23999579996%2362455!&_cdi=5938&view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=a27a4bfb97ee71799d3b9ca9141b5261
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