A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007
RAND Journal of Economics.
1983.
Vol. 14.
No. 2.
P. 301-314.
Тематические разделы:
This article employs weekly time series data on the Joint Executive Committee railroad
cartel from 1880 to 1886 to test empirically the proposition that observed prices
reflected switches from collusive to noncooperative behavior. An equilibrium model
of dynamic oligopoly with asymmetric firms, together with explicit functional form
assumptions about costs and demand, determines the estimating equations and stochastic
structure of the econometric model. The hypothesis that no switch took place, so
that price and quantity movements were solely attributable to exogenous shifts in
the demand and cost functions, is then tested against this alternative and rejected.
Ключевые слова
applied econometrics economic history картель математическое моделирование олигополия прикладная эконометрика теория игр теория некооперативных игр экономическая история
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