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The Dynamic Efficiency of Regulatory Constitutions

Опубликовано на портале: 25-12-2003
RAND Journal of Economics. 1994.  Vol. 25. No. 4. P. 538-554. 
In this article, we model regulation as a repeated game between a utility facing a random sequence of demands and a regulator tempted to underreward past investment. Rate-of-return regulation designed with a constitutional commitment to an adequate rate of return on capital prudently invested is able to support an efficient investment program as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for a larger set of parameter values than rate-of-return regulation without such a commitment. Furthermore, rate-of-return regulation is superior to price regulation according to the same criterion, assuming that the regulator is unable to make state-contingent transfer payments.

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текст статьи в формате pdf на сайте JSTOR:
http://www.jstor.org/view/07416261/di010187/01p0054d/0
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