Altruism in Law and Economics
Опубликовано на портале: 01-09-2003
NBER Working Paper Series.
1997.
No. 217.
Тематический раздел:
A classic example of external benefits is the rescue of the person or property of
strangers in high transaction cost settings. To illustrate, A sees a flowerpot about
to fall on B's (a stranger's) head; if he shouts, B will be saved. A thus has in
his power to confer a considerable benefit on B. The standard economic reaction to
a situation in which there are substantial potential external benefits and high transaction
costs is to propose legal intervention. In the example given, this would mean either
giving A a right to a reward or punishing A if he fails to save B. Either method
is costly and may result in misallocative effects. These objections to using the
law to internalize the external benefits of rescue would be much less imposing were
it not for altruism, a factor ignored in most discussion of externalities. Altruism
may be an inexpensive substitute for costly legal methods of internalizing external
benefits, though this depends on the degree of altruism, the costs of rescue, and
the benefits to the rescue. Although the general legal rule is not to reward the
rescuer (nor to impose liability), the law recognizes the fragility of altruism and
entitles the rescuer to a reward in certain instances. These include rewards to professional
rescuers on land (normally a physician) and to rescuers at sea. In both instances
the costs of rescue are likely to be sufficiently high to discourage rescue unless
the rescuer anticipates compensation.
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