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Why Law, Economics, and Organization?

Опубликовано на портале: 02-09-2003
UC Berkeley School of Law Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper. 2000.  No. 37.
Williamson sketches some of the earlier strains on antitrust law and economics. He identifies a series of key contributions from the organization theory literature which, when interpreted from a transaction cost economizing perspective, provide support for the theory of the firm-as-governance structure. The value added of this construction is then developed by contrasting price theoretic with transaction cost theoretic ways of dealing with a variety of public policy issues. Additional applications to the subject of contract and legal education are then discussed.

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