The Theory of the Firm
Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics.
1999.
Тематические разделы:
This chapter is a survey of modern theories of the firm. Foss, Lando and Thomsen
categorize these as belonging either to the principal-agent or the incomplete contracting
approach. In the former category fall, for example, the Alchian and Demsetz moral
hazard in teams theory as well as Holmstrшm and Milgroms theory of the firm as an
incentive system. Belonging to the incomplete contracting branch are theories that
stress the importance of the employment relationship (for example, Coase and Simon)
as an adaptation mechanism, theories that stress the importance of ownership of assets
for affecting incentives when contracts must be renegotiated (Williamson, Grossman
and Hart, Hart and Moore), and some recent work on implicit contracts (Baker, Gibbons
and Murphy). Authors argue that these different perspectives on the firm should be
viewed as complementary rather than as mutually exclusive and that a synthesis seems
to be emerging.
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NBER Working Paper.
2007.
No. 10363.
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