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Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Insurance: Can Dynamic Data Help to Distinguish?

Опубликовано на портале: 31-08-2003
A standard problem of applied contracts theory is to empirically distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard. Authors show that dynamic insurance data allow to distinguish moral hazard from dynamic selection on unobservables. In the presence of moral hazard, experience rating implies negative occurrence dependence: individual claim intensities decrease with the number of past claims. They discuss econometric tests for the various types of data that are typically available. Finally, they argue that dynamic data also allow to test for adverse selection, even if it is based on asymmetric learning.

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