на главную поиск contacts

The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism

Опубликовано на портале: 14-05-2004
Journal of Political Economy. 2002.  Vol. 110. No. 4. P. 854-882. 
Reputational career concerns provide incentives for short-lived agents to work hard, but it is well known that these incentives disappear as an agent reaches retirement. This paper investigates the effects of a market for firm reputations on the life cycle incentives of firm owners to exert effort. A dynamic general equilibrium model with moral hazard and adverse selection generates two main results. First, incentives of young and old agents are quantitatively equal, implying that incentives are "ageless" with a market for reputations. Second, good reputations cannot act as effective sorting devices: in equilibrium, more able agents cannot outbid lesser ones in the market for good reputations. In addition, welfare analysis shows that social surplus can fall if clients observe trade in firm reputations.
Ключевые слова

См. также:
Т.Р. Ханнанова
Вопросы экономики и права. 2011.  № 1. С. 149-156. 
Ю.Н. Жученко
Экономические науки. 2010.  Т. 68. № 7. С. 126-128. 
Е.Б. Егорова, Я.С. Мязова
Экономические науки. 2010.  Т. 72. № 11. С. 257-260. 
Баграт Айкович Ерзикян
Экономическая наука современной России. 2010.  № 1. С. 8-21. 
Анна Евгеньевна Лукьянова
[Учебная программа]
Марина Андриановна Шабанова
Общественные науки и современность. 2011.  № 1. С. 25-41.