Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
Опубликовано на портале: 12-05-2004
Journal of Economic Theory.
1979.
Vol. 21.
P. 1-9.
Тематический раздел:
Discusses the equilibrium in supergames with evaluation relations determined according
to overtaking criterion. Differences between the situation of players undertaking
to play a single game, and players who know that they will play the same game repeatedly
in the future; Influence of the power of the threats on the existence of equilibrium
points.
Ключевые слова
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