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Inefficient Equilibria in Lobbying

Опубликовано на портале: 14-03-2005
Journal of Public Economics. 2001.  Vol. 82. No. 3. P. 349-375. 
Тематический раздел:
Lobbying is often represented as a common agency game. Common agency games typically have multiple equilibria. One class of equilibria, called truthful, has been identified by Bernheim and Whinston [Quarterly Journal of Economics 1986;101(1):131]. In this paper, we identify another class of equilibria, which we call natural, in which each principal offers a positive contribution on at most one alternative. We run an experiment on a common agency game for which the two equilibria predict a different equilibrium alternative. The alternative predicted by the natural equilibrium is chosen in 65% of the matches, while the one predicted by the truthful equilibrium is chosen in less than 5% of the matches (Journal of Public Economics).

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текст статьи в формате pdf на сайте ScienceDirect:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-44BMCW0-3/2/df913ebff2a4f65849b80dc88d26c6b2
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