на главную поиск contacts

Incentives in Teams

Опубликовано на портале: 22-01-2007
Econometrica. 1973.  Vol. 41. No. 4. P. 617-631. 
This paper analyzes the problem of inducing the members of an organization to behave as if they formed a team. Considered is a conglomerate-type organization consisting of a set of semi-autonomous subunits that are coordinated by the organization's head. The head's incentive problem is to choose a set of employee compensation rules that will induce his subunit managers to communicate accurate information and take optimal decisions. The main result exhibits a particular set of compensation rules, an optimal incentive structure, that leads to team behavior. Particular attention is directed to the informational aspects of the problem. An extended example of a resource allocation model is discussed and the optimal incentive structure is interpreted in terms of prices charged by the head for resources allocated to the subunits.

текст статьи в формате pdf на сайте JSTOR:
Ключевые слова

См. также:
Владимир Исаакович Верховин
Мир России. 2001.  Т. 10. № 1. С. 106-124. 
Drew Fudenberg, David Knudsen Levine
Yildiz Muhamet Yildiz
[Учебная программа]
[Учебная программа]
Drew Fudenberg, Eric S. Maskin
Econometrica. 1986.  Vol. 54. No. 3. P. 533-554. 
John Hillas
Econometrica. 1990.  Vol. 58. No. 6. P. 1365-1390.