Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem
Опубликовано на портале: 29-04-2005
Georgetown University Working Papers.
2004.
No. 03-03-27.
Тематический раздел:
This paper explores the extent to which the presence of ex-ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify and investigate the basic `hold-up problem' which arises whenever the parties to a Coasian negotiation have to pay some ex-ante costs for the negotiation to take place. We then show that a `Coasian solution' to this hold-up problem is not available. This is because a Coasian solution to the hold-up problem typically entails a negotiation about the payment of the costs associated with the future negotiation which in turn is associated with a fresh set of ex-ante costs, and hence with a new hold-up problem
Ключевые слова
hold-up problem благосостояние переговоры повышение благосостояния теорема Коуза теория благосостояния транзакционные издержки
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