Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2004
Journal of Financial Economics.
1984.
Vol. 13.
No. 2.
P. 187-221.
Тематические разделы:
This paper considers a firm that must issue common stock to raise cash to undertake
a valuable investment opportunity. Management is assumed to know more about the firm's
value than potential investors. Investors interpret the firm's actions rationally.
An equilibrium model of the issue-invest decision is developed under these assumptions.
The model shows that firms may refuse to issue stock, and therefore may pass up valuable
investment opportunities. The model suggests explanations for several aspects of
corporate financing behavior, including the tendency to rely on internal sources
of funds, and to prefer debt to equity if external financing is required. Extensions
and applications of the model are discussed.
Статья рекомендуется в учебной программе Seminar in Corporate Finance (Howe J.S.)
Ссылки
текст статьи:http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VBX-45KRN0W-5K&_user=10&_handle=W-WA-A-A-D-MsSAYVA-UUW-AUCAUECUZC-AAYVZACDV-D-U&_fmt=summary&_coverDate=06%2F30%2F1984&_rdoc=3&_orig=browse&_srch=%23toc%235938%231984%23999869997%23304646!&_cdi=5938&view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=9c95224526095337ae4b9170a6c9630f
Ключевые слова
behavior corporate finance investment decision-making investors инвестиции инвестиционное решение финансы корпораций
См. также:
[Интернет-ресурс]
[Конференции и семинары]
[Интернет-ресурс]
Экономические науки.
2010.
Т. 68.
№ 7.
С. 167-171.
[Статья]
Экономическая наука современной России.
2000.
№ 3-4.
С. 5-21.
[Статья]