Capital Structure, Management Ownership and Large External Shareholders: A UK Analysis
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
International Journal of the Economics of Business.
2002.
Vol. 9.
No. 3.
P. 375-399.
Тематические разделы:
This paper examines empirically the effects of management ownership and ownership
by large external shareholders on the capital structure of the firm from an agency
theory perspective. The paper extends the US literature on the topic by examining
the effect of interactions between management ownership and ownership by large external
shareholders on the capital structure of UK firms. For a sample of UK firms, the
paper provides empirical evidence that suggests the debt ratio is positively related
to management ownership and negatively related to ownership by large external shareholders.
Furthermore, the presence of a large external shareholder acts to negate the positive
relationship between debt ratios and management ownership; in the presence of a large
external shareholder, no significant relationship between debt ratios and management
ownership exists. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the presence
of large external shareholders affects the agency costs of debt and equity.
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