Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
2003.
Vol. 38.
No. 1.
P. 159-184.
Тематические разделы:
This paper investigates whether management stock ownership and large non-management
blockholder share ownership are related to firm value across a sample of 1433 firms
from 18 emerging markets. When a management group's controlling exceed its cash flaw
rights, I find that firm values are lower. I also find that large non-management
control limits blockholdings are positively related to firm value. Both of these
effects are significantly more pronounced in countries with low shareholder protection.
One interpretation of these results is that external shareholder protection mechanisms
play a role in restraining managerial agency costs and that large non-management
blockholders can act as a partial substitute for missing institutional governance
mechanisms.
Ключевые слова
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