Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
Опубликовано на портале: 22-01-2007
Econometrica.
1992.
Vol. 60.
No. 5.
P. 993-1008.
Тематические разделы:
The authors investigate the implementation of social choice functions that map to
lotteries over alternatives. They require virtual implementation in iteratively undominated
strategies. Under very weak domain restrictions, they show that if there are three
or more players, any social choice function may be so implemented. The literature
on implementation in Nash equilibrium and its refinements is compromised by its reliance
on game forms with unnatural features (for example, "integer games") or "modulo"
constructions with mixed strategies arbitrarily excluded. In contrast, the authors'
results employ finite (consequently "well-behaved") mechanisms and allow for mixed
strategies.
Ключевые слова
implementation mechanism design Nash equilibrium social choice математическое моделирование общественный выбор равновесие по Нэшу экономическое поведение
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