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Private benefits from control of public corporations

Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003
Journal of Financial Economics. 1989.  Vol. 25. No. 2. P. 371-395. 
We analyze the pricing of 63 block trades between 1978 and 1982 involving at least 5% of the common stock of NYSE or Amex corporations. These blocks are typically priced at substantial premiums to the post-announcement exchange price. We argue that the premiums, which average 20%, reflect private benefits that accrue exclusively to the blockholder because of his voting power. The premiums paid by both individual and corporate block purchasers increase with firm size, fractional ownership, and firm performance. Individuals pay larger premiums for firms with greater leverage, lower stock-return variance, and large cash holdings.

текст статьи в формате PDF доступен на персональной страничке Майкла Барклая
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