на главную поиск contacts

Executive stock ownership and performance: Tracking faint traces

Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003
Journal of Financial Economics. 1997.  Vol. 45. No. 2. P. 223-255. 
We examine the relation between managers' financial interests and firm performance. Since the relation could go in either direction, we cast the analysis in a simultaneous equations framework. For firms involved in acquisitions, we find that acquisition performance and Tobin's Q ratios affect the size of managers' stockholdings. We find no evidence, however, that larger stockholdings lead to better performance. Perhaps management is effectively disciplined by competition in product and labor markets. Alternatively, it may not be necessary for top executives to own stock to be residual claimants. And finally, higher ownership might multiply the opportunities to appropriate corporate wealth.

Статья используется в учебной программе Seminar in Corporate Finance (Howe J.S.)

текст статьи доступен в Ebsco в формате pdf:
Ключевые слова

См. также:
Yoser Gadhoum, Marie-Helene Noiseux, Daniel Zeghal
Investment Management & Financial Innovations. 2005.  Vol. 2. No. 4. P. 50-68. 
Никита Константинович Пирогов, Н А Бобрышев
Корпоративные финансы. 2009.  № 2 (10). С. 40-56. 
Philip C. Anderson, Alva H. Taylor
[Учебная программа]
Tomas Jandik, Craig G. Rennie
ECGI - Finance Working Paper. 2005.  No. 59/2004.
John E. Core, Robert W. Holthausen, David F. Larcker
Journal of Financial Economics. 1999.  No. 51. P. 371-406.