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Distortionary Domestic Taxation and Pareto-Efficient International Taxation

Опубликовано на портале: 03-05-2005
CESifo Working Papers. 2002.  No. 635.
This paper characterises the domestic tax systems which yield Pareto-efficient outcomes for a two-country world economy in which each country uses distortionary taxes. Such outcomes are compared with the Nash equilibria of the world economy when each country uses its domestic tax system to influence ist terms of trade. In such circumstances, the implementation of domestic tax systems which achieve a globally Pareto-efficient outcome as a Nash equilibrium will be very difficult, for two main reasons: the ability of countries to use tax policy with respect to non-traded goods for protection, and the fact that Pareto-efficient tax structures depend on countries‘ distributional judgements, which are hard to measure objectively.

текст статьи в формате pdf на сайте Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge:
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Сергей Германович Синельников-Мурылев, Павел Анатольевич Кадочников, К. Непесов, Денис Николаевич Некипелов, Елена Викторовна Шкребела, Л. Анисимова, Ирина Викторовна Стародубровская, Саид Белетбекович Баткибеков, Маргарита Юрьевна Славгородская, Юрий Николаевич Бобылев, Татьяна Александровна Малинина