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Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently

Опубликовано на портале: 22-01-2007
Econometrica. 1987.  Vol. 55. No. 3. P. 615-632. 
Several partners jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner has a valuation for the asset; the valuations are known privately and drawn independently from a common probability distribution. We characterize the set of all incentive-compatible and interim- individually- rational trading mechanisms, and give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for such mechanisms to dissolve the partnership ex post efficiently. A bidding game is constructed that achieves such dissolution whenever it is possible. Despite incomplete information about the valuation of the asset, a partnership can be dissolved ex post efficiently provided no single partner owns too large a share; this contrasts with Myerson and Satterthwaite's result that ex post efficiency cannot be achieved when the asset is owned by a single party.

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текст статьа в формате pdf на сайте JSTOR:
http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers1984-1989/87econ-dissolving-a-partnership-efficiently.pdf
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