Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading
Опубликовано на портале: 22-01-2007
Journal of Economic Theory.
1981.
Vol. 29.
No. 2.
Тематический раздел:
We consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object.
The seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation for the object are assumed to be
independent random variables, and each individual's valuation is unknown to the other.
We characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are Bayesian incentive compatible
and individually rational, and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient
mechanisms without outside subsidies. For a wide class of problems we show how to
compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade, and mechanisms
that can maximize a broker's expected profit.
Ключевые слова
bargaining bayesian game mechanism design байесовский механизм задача с торгом математическое моделирование экономическое поведение
См. также:
On the Relation between the Expected Value and the Volatility of the Nominal Excess
Return on Stocks
Journal of Finance.
1993.
Vol. 48.
No. 5.
P. 1779-1801.
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