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Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information

Опубликовано на портале: 22-01-2007
Econometrica. 1984.  Vol. 52. No. 1. P. 87-100. 
Тематический раздел:
Recent work in game theory has shown that, in principle, it may be possible for firms in an industry to form a self-policing cartel to maximize their joint profits. This paper examines the nature of cartel self-enforcement in the presence of demand uncertainty. A model of a noncooperatively supported cartel is presented, and the aspects of industry structure which would make such a cartel viable are discussed.

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текст статьи в формате pdf на сайте JSTOR:
http://www.jstor.org/view/00129682/di952669/95p0005q/0
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