на главную поиск contacts

Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium

Опубликовано на портале: 22-01-2007
Econometrica. 1993.  Vol. 61. No. 5. P. 1019-1045. 
Тематический раздел:
Subjective utility maximizers, in an infinitely repeated game, will learn to predict opponents' future strategies and will converge to play according to a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. Players' initial uncertainty is placed directly on opponents' strategies and the above result is obtained under the assumption that the individual beliefs are compatible with the chosen strategies. An immediate corollary is that, when playing a Harsanyi-Nash equilibrium of a repeated game of incomplete information about opponents' payoff matrices, players will eventually play a Nash equilibrium of the real game, as if they had complete information.

текст статьи в формате pdf на сайте JSTOR:
Ключевые слова

См. также:
Владимир Исаакович Верховин
Мир России. 2001.  Т. 10. № 1. С. 106-124. 
Drew Fudenberg, David Knudsen Levine
Yildiz Muhamet Yildiz
[Учебная программа]
[Учебная программа]
Drew Fudenberg, Eric S. Maskin
Econometrica. 1986.  Vol. 54. No. 3. P. 533-554. 
John Hillas
Econometrica. 1990.  Vol. 58. No. 6. P. 1365-1390.