Corporate Governance
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007
Econometrica.
2001.
Vol. 69.
No. 1.
P. 1-35.
Тематический раздел:
The paper first develops an economic analysis of the concept of shareholder value,
describes its approach, and discusses some open questions. It emphasizes the relationship
between pledgeable income, monitoring, and control rights using a unifying and simple
framework.
The paper then provides a first and preliminary analysis of the concept of the stakeholder
society. It investigates whether the managerial incentives and the control structure
described in the first part can be modified so as to promote the stakeholder society.
It shows that the implementation of the stakeholder society strikes three rocks:
dearth of pledgeable income, deadlocks in decision-making, and lack of clear mission
for management.
While it fares better than the stakeholder society on those three grounds, shareholder
value generates biased decision-making; the paper analyzes the costs and benefits
of various methods of protecting noncontrolling stakeholders: covenants, exit options,
flat claims, enlarged fiduciary duty.
Ключевые слова
См. также:
Journal of Corporate Finance.
2002.
Vol. 8.
No. 1.
P. 49-66.
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Университетское управление.
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№ 1.
С. 10-13.
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Corporate Governance: An International Review.
2004.
Vol. 12.
No. 4.
P. 461-478.
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Российский журнал менеджмента.
2013.
Т. 11.
№ 4.
С. 31-56.
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Research & Regulation Working Papers.
2005.
No. 2005-1.
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Corporate Governance: An International Review.
2005.
Vol. 13.
No. 3.
P. 386 - 396.
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