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Estimation of Quantity Games in the Presence of Indivisibilities and Heterogeneous Firms

Опубликовано на портале: 23-11-2004
This paper presents a theoretical framework that allows estimation of game theoretic models of quantity competition, including a non-trivial class of differentiated product quantity games. The simplest and yet arguably most important examples of a quantity games are entry games. In entry games the choice firms make is discrete (enter/don’t enter) and as a result I study a su fficiently general class of models to allow for either continous or integer quantity choices. The main theoretical results of the paper establish easily verifiable conditions under which an index of market output is uniquely determined within the set of Nash equilibria. The model’s parameters may then be estimated by comparing the predicted index of market output in a cross section of markets. The paper provides both a generalization and an extension of the theoretical results developed by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Berry (1992) which allowed estimation of the homogeneous products entry game. I illustrate one member of the class of models that these results allow us to estimate by developing a model of discrete quantity competition using count data from the supermarket industry.

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