Related Party Transactions: Associations with Corporate Governance and Firm Value
Опубликовано на портале: 19-04-2007
EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Papers.
2004.
No. 4377.
Тематический раздел:
Recent corporate scandals have raised considerable concern among regulators and stock
market participants about related party transactions (RPTs), prompting Sarbanes-Oxley
(SOX) to prohibit personal loans to executives and non-executive board members. In
a representative sample of companies for a period that predates SOX, we find RPTs
are wide spread and involve equally executives and non-executive board members; additionally,
the proportion of related party loans is smaller than other non-loan related party
transactions such as purchases or direct services. When we examine the relationship
between RPTs and the extant literature's corporate governance mechanisms (such as
board characteristics, CEO pay-performance sensitivity, and outside monitors), we
generally find weaker corporate governance mechanisms associated with more and higher
dollar amounts of RPTs. We also find that industry-adjusted returns are negatively
associated with RPTs. On further examination of loans versus other types of RPTs
not considered in SOX, we find a negative relationship between industry-adjusted
returns and the number and dollar amount of loans to executives and non-executive
directors, and a similar relationship between the number of other types of RPTs with
non-executive directors. In summary, our results provide support for the view of
RPTs as conflicts of interest between managers/board members and their shareholders,
in contrast with the view of RPTs as efficient transactions.
Ключевые слова
См. также:
Эмпирическое исследование интеллектуальной стоимости крупных российских компаний
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