Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements
Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007
Journal of Political Economy. 1985. Vol. 3. No. 93. P. 488-511.
This research began as an investigation into how a change in one market can have ramifications in a second market, even if the demands in the two markets are unrelated. We found that a critical issue in determining the nature of the interaction was whether competitors regarded products as strategic substitutes or strategic complements. In other words, would a more aggressive strategy by one firm in a market elicit an aggressive response from its competitors, or would an aggressive move be met with accommodation (competitors playing less aggressively than previously)? It has long been suspected that any result in oligopoly theory, or its converse, can be generated by an appropriate choice of assumptions. Strategic substitutes and complements help explain this basic ambiguity and so focus on a critical distinction. When thinking about oligopoly markets the crucial question may not be, Do these markets exhibit price competition or quantity competition or competition using some other strategic variable? but rather, Do competitors think of the products as strategic substitutes or as strategic complements?
multimarket model multinational firms математическое моделирование олигополия экономическое поведение
Персональная страница Алвина Рота (Alvin E. Roth, Professor of Economics and Business Administration in the Department of Economics at Harvard University): Al Roth's game theory and experimental economics page
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