Эксоцман
на главную поиск contacts

Market Structure, Organizational Structure, and R&D Diversity

Опубликовано на портале: 03-05-2005
Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL. 2002.  No. 0303006.
We examine the effects of market structure and the internal organization of firms on equilibrium R&D projects. We compare a monopolist’s choice of R&D portfolio to that of a welfare maximizer. We next show that Sah and Stiglitz’s finding that the market portfolio of R&D is independent of the number of firms under Bertrand competition extends to neither Cournot oligopoly nor a cartel. We also show that the ability of firms to pre-empt R&D by rivals along particular research paths can lead to socially excessive R&D diversification. Lastly, using Sah and Stiglitz’s definition of hierarchy, we establish conditions under which larger hierarchies invest in smaller portfolios.

Ссылки
текст статьи в формате pdf на сайте Econometrics Laboratory Software Archive:
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/users/gilbert/wp/Mkt_R&D092602.pdf
BiBTeX
RIS
Ключевые слова

См. также:
Алла Николаевна Стерлигова
Вестник унивеситета (Государственный университет управления). 2006.  Т. 17. № 4. С. 183-194. 
[Статья]
Jack R. Meredith, Scott M. Shafer
[Книга]
Michael Pollitt
[Учебная программа]
Frank A. Wolak, Robert H. Patrick
NBER Working Paper Series. 1997.  No. 8248.
[Статья]
Richard Charles Levin, Wesley Marc Cohen
[Книга]
Richard J. Gilbert, Justine Hastings
Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL. 2002.  No. 0201001.
[Статья]