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Global Games and Equilibrium Selection

Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007
Econometrica. 1993.  Vol. 61. No. 5. P. 989-1018. 
Тематический раздел:
A global game is an incomplete information game where the actual payoff structure is determined by a random draw from a given class of games and where each player makes a noisy observation of the selected game. For 2 x 2 games, it is shown that, when the noise vanishes, iterated elimination of dominated strategies in the global game forces the players to conform to J. C. Harsanyi and R. Selten's risk dominance criterion.

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